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ABSTRACT
This study demonstrates that tactical nuclear weapons occupied a central and essential
role in US military policy for confronting the Peoples Republic of China between 1950 and
1963. Historians seldom look at tactical nuclear weapons as a separate and distinct component
of American foreign policy and generally place these weapons as a subset of a strategic doctrine
directed at the Soviet Union. When examined as a separate component of military policy,
however, tactical nuclear weapons proved to be indispensable tools for the American leadership
to deal with the complex relationship between the United States, the People’s Republic of China
and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Such weapons allowed each of the three administrations
examined in this study (Harry Truman’s, Dwight Eisenhower’s and John Kennedy’s) to commit
the United States to defense obligations that would otherwise have been impossible. As these
weapons developed from their infancy in the late 1940s through a number of aggressive field
deployments in the 1950s, US presidents repeatedly turned to tactical nuclear weapons when
considering their military options for confronting China. The role of tactical nuclear weapons
strengthened with each passing presidency and with each crisis between China and the United
States. From these crises, tactical nuclear weapons evolved from inefficient weapons systems of
Korean War policy, to a key element of a defensive military policy to contain China, and, in their
final iteration, as an instrument that not only to assured containment, but was also considered as
a possible method of depriving China from obtaining its own nuclear weapons.
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INTRODUCTION
Between 1950 and 1963, the United States considered using nuclear weapons against the
People’s Republic of China no less than eight times. The conditions behind these considerations
ranged from the Korean War, two Taiwan Straits crises, contingency planning for expected
crises to pre-emptive action against Chinese nuclear weapons development facilities. Each and
every one of these considerations involved planning for using tactical nuclear weapons against
China.
This study will demonstrate that tactical nuclear weapons evolved to become an essential
instrument of American policy for containing China. U.S. presidents identified a clear
distinction between tactical weapons and their strategic counterparts and worked to use that
distinction to their advantage in maintaining the alliances required to contain the People’s
Republic of China. This distinct role for tactical nuclear weapons helped to maintain a level of
prestige for the American military, which US policymakers felt was necessary in order to
preserve the alliance system in Asia.
A considerable historiography centered on nuclear weapons has already been written, but
much of it places nuclear weapons in the context of deterrence theory, war avoidance and
mutually assured destruction.1 Other interpretations have been devoted to debating the role of

1

Mandelbaum, Michael, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 3-12. The utilization of nuclear weapons in this manner has been described by
Mandelbaum’s premise with the anarchical environment of international politics. Nuclear weapons, he argues, did
not remove anarchy from the system of nations, but, instead, revolutionized the means of which nations relate to
each other in the post-Hiroshima/Nagasaki age. Nuclear weapons act, by making general war too devastating and
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strategic weapons as a restraining influence, limiting the scope of international conflict during
the Cold War versus a viewpoint that nuclear weapons de-stabilized the international order and
increased risk of global war.2 These interpretations all attribute to American nuclear policy a
single, strategic goal, without regard for the distinctions between tactical and strategic
applications.3 This study will examine the unique role of tactical weapons in achieving the
objective of establishing localized and regional military control as part of a defense commitment
to an ally in order to fulfill a policy goal of containing China.
Terminology and Definitions

Nuclear weapons exponentially expanded the destructive power of any military force that
employed them. This revolution in military ordnance introduced with it a new terminology,
required to address the inadequacies of the descriptive terms of the old world. Nuclear fission or
fission is a subatomic process where atoms are split by the bombardment of neutrons. The act of

eliminating winners in such a war, as a stabilizing influence. Since general war would lead to national destruction,
nations pursued policies designed to avoid major war. The pursuit of such war-avoidance policies led to a system of
alliances between the superpowers that came to define the Cold War international order. Additionally, Mandelbaum
argues that a critical element of war-avoidance lay in a continuous state of military, retaliatory readiness as a means
of discouraging aggressive actions, and that the requirement for a continuous state of readiness translated into the
nuclear arms race.
2
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997),
86, 110. Gaddis supports the theory that nuclear weapons stabilized the Cold War by limiting the scope of conflict.
He cites the existence of the US and Soviet nuclear stockpiles as restraining each other and preventing escalation of
the Korean conflict. Joseph Gerson, Empire and the Bomb: How the US uses Nuclear Weapons to Dominate the
World (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 4-5. Gerson argues that the United States utilized the destabilizing influence of
nuclear weapons to promote an aggressive expansion of American influence on the international stage. By
enforcing this policy, Gerson states the US was able to expand its global influence through the use of nuclear
blackmail.
3
Stephen Younger, The Bomb: A New History. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), 50. The author best
explains that the distinction is not recognized is derived from the belief that using tactical nuclear weapons within
the framework of limited military action would escalate to general war with strategic nuclear weapons.
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splitting or fissioning atoms releases great amounts of energy. Fusion, on the other hand,
involves the combining of two hydrogen atoms to form a helium atom. The energy released in a
fusion reaction is often considerably greater than that released in a fission reaction. Atomic
weapons, or Atomic Bombs, are weapons that use nuclear fission to derive their explosive power.
A Hydrogen Bomb is an exclusive term for a gravity-delivered weapon that utilizes fusion to
create its destructive effects. Nuclear Weapons encompass both fission and fusion weapons of
all types, and includes bombs, warheads found in missiles, naval ordinance and artillery shells.
The pentomic military is a term used for the restructuring of the US military at the divisional
level which incorporated nuclear weapons into battlefield operations. Tactical nuclear weapons
refer to nuclear weapons employed directly on the battlefield with the intent of deciding a
localized military engagement. Strategic nuclear weapons refer to nuclear weapons used against
non-battlefield targets such as industrial centers, large population centers or other national
infrastructure targets. In the realm of nuclear weapons policy Counterforce refers to enemy
combatant forces while Countervalue refers to enemy population centers.4 Deterrence or
Deterrence Force is the concept of using the threat of force to deter an opposing state or nation
from conducting an action.5 Second Strike Force Capability is the capability of a nation’s
nuclear forces to survive an enemy first strike in order to conduct retaliatory action.6 It should be
4

“Counterforce and Countervalue,” Nuclearfiles.org, accessed April 18, 2016, http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/keyissues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-countervalue-force.htm .
5
“Deterrence,” Nuclearfiles.org, accessed April 18, 2016, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclearweapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-deterrence.htm .
6
“Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management: Phase II – Review of the
DOD Nuclear Mission, December, 2008, Department of Defense” nuclearfiles.org, accessed April 18, 2016,
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu///key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/us-nuclearpolicy/weapons/PhaseIIReportFinal%5B1%5D.pdf .
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noted that a tactical weapon may be used strategically, and a visa-versa. The defining element
for a nuclear weapon, therefore, is the role for which the weapon is used.7 Limited War is a
conflict involving a portion of a nation’s military and industrial assets, while General War
involves a considerable portion, sometimes the entire portion, of a nation’s military and
industrial capability aimed at warfighting.

Methodology and Chapter Outline

To obtain a clear picture of the role tactical nuclear weapons played in American China
policy, eight crises, events and contingency plans were examined. These range from the Korean
War (1950-1953), the first major crisis between the United States and China, through 1963 with
the end of the Kennedy Administration and the realization that a nuclear-armed China was an
inevitability. The following questions were applied to each event, crisis and contingency in this
study. Why did US presidents consider military action against China. Did the presidential
administrations of Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy truly recognize a distinction between
tactical nuclear weapons and their strategic counterparts. What was the degree of importance
afforded to tactical nuclear weapons by each president? What factors, both political and military,
influenced the considerations for tactical weapon utilization? What specific aspects of China
policy led US presidents to resort to view tactical nuclear weapons as an essential component in

John T Cappello and Gwendolyn M. Hall, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Debunking the Mythology,” INSS
Occasional Paper 46, (August, 2002), USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado.
7
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military planning? Why and how did US presidents become dependent on tactical nuclear
weapons when considering military options against China? How then, did each president
employ tactical nuclear weapons in policy against China, and how close did these considerations
come to actual implementation?
Chapter One examines the Truman Administration’s attempts to find a role for nuclear
weapons during the Korean War and ultimately deciding not to use those weapons. Historians
such as John Lewis Gaddis and Appu Soman attribute fear of Soviet involvement for explaining
why the United States did not use nuclear weapons in Korea.8 This chapter will, instead, show
that a lack of tactical nuclear capability played a much more important role than fear of Soviet
retaliation. The inability to use nuclear weapons effectively on the Korean battlefield wielded
much more influence with the United States’ military decision against using them than concerns
that the Soviets would interfere. The inability to effectively use tactical weapons also explains
how prestige and the perception of American military strength became a driving factor in
confronting China. Additionally, this study will reinforce the historiographical belief espoused
by Nina Tannnenwald that international pressures, in the form of maintaining the alliance, also
played a critical role in why nuclear weapons were not used during the Korean War.9

8

Appu K. Soman, Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China,
1950-1958, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 217-218. Soman subscribes to the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons,
but also addresses a destabilizing influence in that the American nuclear stockpile encouraged Truman (and
subsequent presidents) toward confrontation because nuclear weapons could be used to extract US military forces
from untenable military situations.
9
Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945,
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Tannenwald presents a new interpretation that challenges the
stabilization theory for nuclear weapons. The author argues that an international taboo rather than war avoidance
policies, were the reason nuclear weapons were not used during the Cold War. This taboo, directed against all
nuclear weapons was created by a loose, unorganized conglomeration of anti-nuclear political movements both in
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Chapter Two explores Eisenhower’s introduction of the New Look military and his
military solutions for ending the Korean War and contingency planning to defend South Korea in
the event of a renewed Korean War. Historians such as Rosemary Foote often focus their
attention on the extensive diplomatic efforts to end the war and identifying the primary reasons
for that end.10 This chapter will focus on the role of the administration’s considerations to use
nuclear weapons to end the Korean War, had diplomatic efforts failed. This examination will
illustrate how nuclear weapons had moved to a central position in military planning against
China. Furthermore, it will be seen that the role of tactical nuclear doctrine had advanced in
importance from the Truman Administration, but not quite to the point of becoming a separate
option in military policy.
Chapter Three addresses Eisenhower’s China policy and the expanded role tactical
nuclear weapons would play in the two Taiwan Straits crises. A majority of historians tend to
focus attention on Eisenhower’s modernization of the US military, called the New Look policy,
and the creation of the pentomic military as a strategic response to the Soviet Union by using the
nuclear arms race to formulate a war avoidance policy based upon the concept of massive
retaliation and mutually assured destruction for any two nuclear-armed powers.11 This chapter

the US and abroad. This taboo manifested itself in the form of domestic and international pressures to influence the
decisions to refrain from using nuclear weapons.
10
Rosemary J. Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,” International Security 13, no. 3
(Winter, 1988-1989):108-109.
11
Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1998), xii. Craig builds on the stabilizing theory by explaining Eisenhower’s integration of nuclear weapons
into the military was a deliberate effort to restrict United States options in any given crisis in order to avoid general
war. Craig argues that Eisenhower’s nuclear policy consisted of an “all or nothing” tactic, where any consideration
of military options carried with it a high risk of nuclear war, thereby forcing the president to choose a diplomatic

6

will show that Eisenhower’s continuance of Truman’s China policy, which continued to be
influenced by the role of prestige, and the incorporation of tactical nuclear weapons into military
policy via the pentomic military created an environment that drove the United States to threaten
China with nuclear attack. Tactical weapons played a crucial role by allowing the United States
to commit itself to defending the Republic of China and its surrounding territories. Over the
course of the administration, tactical nuclear weapons assumed a singular and distinct role in
military policy. Though Eisenhower believed in the military utility and supremacy of tactical
nuclear weapons, he recognized the political limitations of nuclear weapons, particularly in light
of public and international pressures against them.
Chapter Four examines the Kennedy Administration’s continued reliance on tactical
nuclear weapons in military planning against China. The Kennedy Administration is most often
defined historically by its relationship with the Soviet Union, yet twice during his administration,
the president planned to attack China with tactical nuclear weapons. This chapter explains how
Kennedy recognized the detrimental effects for the United States within the international
community for defending Taiwan but still allowed domestic factors to steer policy towards
confrontation. Once again, tactical nuclear weapons continued to play an essential role in
American planning and considerations as the United States coped with the imminent rise of
China as a nuclear-armed, international power, as well as the possibility of Chinese attacks on
not just Taiwan or the offshores islands, but also India. Under the Kennedy Administration,

option, since there was no nonnuclear military option available. This policy, according to the author, is the primary
reason why the United States did not enter into war with the Soviet Union during the 1950s.

7

however, tactical nuclear weapons policy went a step further than previous administrations when
they were considered for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Chinese nuclear weapons
development facilities.

8

CHAPTER ONE: TRUMAN, THE KOREAN WAR AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
Truman’s nuclear policy during the Korean War is often placed in the context of strategic
policy, deterrence and domestic politics. Historian Roger Dingman, for example, makes a case
that Truman’s actions were designed as much to prove to Republicans that he was tough on
Communism as it was to warn the Soviet Union not to interfere in Korea.12 John Lewis Gaddis
argues that Truman used nuclear weapons and the Korean War to justify the massive rearmament
of the United States military, as outlined in NSC-68.13 This chapter will prove that Truman and
his advisors sought out various methods in which nuclear weapons could be used during critical
moments of the Korean War. It will be seen that even though the Truman Administration
explored several methods of nuclear policy, it struggled against technical and political obstacles
that blocked efforts to use nuclear weapons. The technology of tactical nuclear weapons had not
matured to the point of providing workable systems that could be used against enemy ground
forces. This lack of maturity in tactical nuclear weapons threatened the credibility of the United
States military while surprisingly strong resistance from United States allies over nuclear
weapons, both factored heavily in the decision to refrain from using nuclear weapons in Korea.

Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” International Security 13, no 3 (Winter, 19881989): 63-65.
13
Gaddis, 107.
12
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Setting the Stage: Truman and China

In late 1949, communist Chinese forces, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, defeated
the last of the Chinese Nationalist forces on the Asian mainland, thereby ending a three-year civil
war on continental Asia. The Nationalist leader and American ally, Chiang Kai-shek, fled to the
island of Taiwan and re-established the Republic of China there. The flight of Chiang and the
rise of Mao as a world leader capped a series of events that challenged American policymakers
attempting to cope with the new, post-World War Two international order. The aftermath of
World War Two erased decades of European dominance over the international order and
supplanted it with a new international order that introduced a new set of dominant players and
military concepts. The United States, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China
would emerge as the leading economic and military world powers. In the year prior to the fall of
the Chinese Nationalists, the Soviet Union had blockaded Berlin and conducted its first nuclear
weapons test. The events in China, Europe and the Soviet Union combined to impress upon US
policymakers, and the American public, that the post-war international order was divided
between two diametrically opposed systems, the Soviet Union and China, combined as
monolithic communist entities, versus the United States and its allies.
The US president at the end of World War Two, Harry Truman, faced a world devastated
by over a decade of worldwide military conflict. The US emerged as the most powerful nation
on earth, its military and technical prowess emphasized by the use of two nuclear weapons
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against Japan in the waning days of the war. The next most powerful nation, the Soviet Union,
occupied much of eastern Europe, and possessed the largest army in the world.
US State Department advisors portrayed the Soviets as a paranoid version of Imperial
Russia and called for the use of patience, resolve and material strength to change Soviet
policies.14 China, on the other hand, posed no current military or economic threat to the United
States. The immediate attention of the Truman Administration focused on the Soviet Union and
Europe.15
President Truman also faced domestic pressures from Congress and the American public.
Both wanted a rapid demobilization of US military forces from Europe. European leaders
resisted de-mobilization, fearing encroachment by the Soviet Union in absence of the US
military. Initial post-war plans relied on a US-backed England to control the Soviets in Europe.
The collapse of the English economy in 1947, however, rendered that plan untenable.16 A
second plan was then devised, which called for a strong military, including a nuclear deterrent
force, the rebuilding the European economy and the creation of mutual defense treaties and
military aid packages to US allies.17
Enacting this strategy met resistance from the American public, which did not favor
losing tax cuts and facing increased taxes and inflation to pay for the plan. To mobilize both
Congress and the American public behind this policy, Truman addressed the country on March

14

Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict,
1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 32-33.
15
June Grasso, Truman’s Two-China Policy, 1948-1950, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1987), 4.
16
Christensen, 35.
17
Ibid. 38-39.
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12, 1947, with his Truman Doctrine speech. This speech, designed to gain support for giving aid
specifically to Turkey and Greece, described the international order as a conflict between
communism and democracy. To protect democracy, Truman pledged that the United States
would fight international communism at any location in the world.18
Truman’s speech succeeded in bringing approval for aid to Greece and Turkey, but
generated unforeseen results regarding China. From the point of view of Congress, the situation
in China fit neatly into the president’s new doctrine. While Truman would rather have
selectively enforced the doctrine, Congress viewed the doctrine as a globally inclusive policy.
As a result, the powerful conglomerate of political and public forces, called the “China Lobby,”19
held the president’s European policy hostage, agreeing to pass the necessary legislation to aid
Greece and Turkey only if similar aid reached the Republic of China. The China Aid Bill,
passed in 1948, became part of a compromise deal to ensure passage of European aid
legislation.20
With the collapse of the Nationalists on mainland Asia in 1949, the United States faced a
dilemma over how to treat its defeated ally. The Nationalists were expected to survive for no
more than three years.21 American diplomat George Kennan proposed using the US military to

18

Christensen, 50-52.
Earnest R. May, “When Marshall Kept the U.S. Out of War in China,” The Journal of Military History 66 no. 4
(Oct., 2002): 1005-1006. The author provides the best and most concise description of the conglomeration of
American elements that vocally called for continued support of the Nationalists in China. This lobby comprised of
national press outlets sympathetic to the Nationalist cause, a Republican majority in Congress which viewed the
president as soft on communism, and members of the military, particularly the Navy.
20
Ibid., 61-62.
21
ORE 76-49 Survival Potential of Noncommunist Regimes in China, Oct 19, 1949, CIA website, accessed April
18, 2016, http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0001098226 .
19
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overthrow Chiang and establish Taiwan as a United States protectorate. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson had preferred to abandon Chiang Kai-Shek, and he persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) to accept the same point of view. The Nationalist Chinese, however, still retained support
from elements in the United States. Republicans in Congress and the Senate, as well as popular
World War Two General Douglas MacArthur argued publicly for the need to deny Taiwan to the
Chinese Communists.22
In the face of domestic pressure, Truman chose to keep US participation with Taiwan to a
minimum. On January 5, 1950, the president went on record to state that the United States
would not become involved in the Chinese civil war and that the United States would not have
bases in Taiwan or provide military advice to Nationalist forces.23 A week later, Acheson further
clarified the administration’s position, stating that the United States considered Taiwan to be

Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1994), 165-167.
23
Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972, (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 291-292; Christiansen, 194; Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China:
A History of Sino-American Relations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 165-167; Jian Chen, China’s
Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1994), 213-216: Andrew J. Nathan, and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for
Security, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. 1997), 56-59; Gaddis, 62-63. The historiography of
American China policy can be divided into three interpretations, American responsibility for the confrontation,
Chinese responsibility, and a shared responsibility. Adherents blaming the US include Gordon Chang, who cites an
American policy geared toward splitting the Sino-Soviet alliance, and Thomas Christensen who identifies Truman’s
inclusion of Taiwan into the American sphere of influence as part of an anti-Communism policy as fueling the
confrontation with China. Historians who blame China include Warren Cohen, who blames Chiang Kai-Shek for
refusing to cooperate in a coalition government with the Chinese Communist Party, leading to the resumption of the
Chinese Civil War. Chen Jian also argues that China bears the responsibility for confrontation with the US, citing
Chinese revolutionary nationalism, the Chinese perception that they held an obligation of loyalty to international
communism, and a Chinese political goal of maintaining the dynamics of the domestic communist revolution in
China. Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross argue that Mao Zedong always intended to align with the Soviet Union and
were obligated to confront the US as part of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Finally, John Lewis Gaddis adopts a middle
ground approach, citing US domestic pressures and Truman’s lack of clear policy objectives combined with China’s
self-imposed domestic conditions as leading to a state of confrontation between the two nations.
22

13

Chinese territory.24 Six months later, the outbreak of the Korean War, brought Taiwan back into
the sphere of American interest and led to a series of confrontations with China.25 Through these
confrontations, tactical nuclear weapons would become the central instrument of military policy
used to contain China.

The Korean War Begins

On June 25, 1950, forces of the North Korean military attacked South Korea and made
considerable advances down the peninsula, driving before them South Korean forces and a small
contingent of American advisors. Prior to the outbreak of war, Korea did not possess a
significant place in American defense policy. The small, peninsular nation that divides the
Yellow Sea from the Sea of Japan, shared borders with China and the Soviet Union, and lay less
than 100 miles from Japan, was divided into north and south halves in August, 1948, at the 38th
parallel. The northern half of Korea was ruled by a communist government under the leadership
of Kim il Sung. The southern half of Korea was led by President Syngman Rhee, placed in
power primarily through the efforts of the United States.26
That North Korea might attack South Korea in an attempt to reunite Korea did not escape
the attention of the Truman Administration. Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt that should

24

Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York, W.W. Norton and
Company, Inc. 1969), 351.
26

Bruce Cummings, The Korean War: A History, (New York: Modern Library, 2010), 109-112.
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war break out on the Korean peninsula, the US should use the United Nations to deal with the
situation, and not the US military.27 The United States perceived Communist North Korea as a
satellite of the Soviet Union. This impression led to the belief that North Korea could not
conduct long term military operations against South Korea without substantial Soviet support.
Nor did the administration believe China would involve itself in Korea, believing that fear of
general war over Korea would drive the Soviets to restrain China from interfering on the Korean
peninsula.28 Even if North Korea attacked, the administration placed its faith in the South
Korean military to defend itself.29 As a result, the administration publicly stated, through
Acheson and MacArthur, that Korea was not considered part of the American Pacific defense
perimeter.30
The June 25 attack itself did not surprise the Truman Administration, but North Korea’s
remarkable gains against the South Koreans did. The success of this attack, believed only
possible with Soviet aid, cemented in the minds of Truman and his advisors that international
communism posed a significant threat to American national security.31 Policymakers in the
Truman Administration felt that the attack in Korea presented an opportunity to curtail Soviet

27

Ibid., 72.
Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, June 19, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States
(hereafter referenced as FRUS), 1950, Korea, Volume VII, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1950), 109.
29
Cummings, 72.
30
Acheson, 357. Acheson stated that the United States Pacific defense perimeter consisted of the Philippines,
Okinawa, the Ryukyu archipelago, Japan, the Aleutians and Alaska. Excluded were both Korea and Taiwan.
MacArthur publicly identified the same perimeter March 1, 1949.
31
Wilson D. Miscamble, “The Foreign Policy of the Truman Administration: A Post-Cold War Appraisal,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 24, no 3 Conduct of Foreign Policy (Summer, 1994): 488-489; Robert Griffith,
“Truman and the Historians: The Reconstruction of Postwar American History,” The Wisconsin Magazine of History
59 no 1 (Autumn, 1975): 31; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 291-292; Gaddis, 75-84.
28
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expansion and influence. While it was hoped that the North Koreans could be stopped quickly,
and by the South Koreans, there remained considerable concern over the reaction of the Soviet
Union to any American, or United Nations, actions in Korea. The cautious, prevailing opinion in
the administration, especially amongst the military, was that the Soviet Union was not ready for
war.32
Nevertheless, as part of a contingency option, the use of nuclear weapons was discussed
as a means of eliminating Soviet fighters based in Shanghai. On the evening of June 25, Truman
ordered the USAF to make preparations for destroying all Soviet airfields in the Far East region,
but not to take action. Army General Douglas MacArthur was to send a survey group to Korea,
and the State Department was instructed to determine where the Soviets might act next.33 Over
the next week, while South Korean forces retreated, the United Nations formed a unified
command under the leadership of MacArthur.
MacArthur thought the situation in Korea provided a unique opportunity to use nuclear
weapons, and requested that the JCS grant him atomic bombs.34 The JCS already had a
contingency to move nuclear weapons to Guam in the event of an Asian crisis, thus the JCS
approved MacArthur’s request and dispatched ten nuclear weapons from the stockpile to the
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Pacific base. These weapons, however, remained outside of MacArthur’s command and required
72 hours to assemble and a presidential order before they could be used.35
Even as the United States Air Force (USAF) shuttled nuclear weapons across the Pacific,
the higher levels of the military and the administration had developed concerns over their use.
Specialists in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs argued that there were few viable targets in
Korea and that world opinion would be overwhelmingly negative.36 A JCS study substantiated
the opinions of the Far Eastern bureau, finding that the situation in Korea did not provide a
favorable environment for the employment of nuclear weapons. The JCS worried that
ineffective use of nuclear weapons would harm the strategic deterrent value of the nuclear
stockpile.37 At Strategic Air Command (SAC), General Curtiss LeMay argued that any nuclear
bombardment of Korea should be conducted as part of a larger strategic nuclear bombardment of
China.38 Even those in the administration who advocated the use of nuclear weapons conceded
that such employment could have considerable consequences, including escalation into general
war with the Soviet Union and alienating US allies.39
At this point in the conflict, the American nuclear arsenal remained relatively small, with
approximately 300 Mark 4 atomic bombs in the entire stockpile, all of them strategic in nature
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and reserved for use against the Soviet Union.40 Early in the Korean War, the administration
faced a number of challenges in defining a role for nuclear weapons. Though the United States
had no nuclear weapons dedicated to the tactical mission, Truman still tried to find some use for
nuclear weapons in the Korean conflict. Elements of the administration could not form a
consensus over what role nuclear weapons would play. Truman and the JCS quickly made
nuclear weapons the central component in countering Soviet Air Force involvement. MacArthur
wanted to use them against ground forces, even though the military’s own findings found the
Mark 4 atomic bomb was not suitable for ground combat.41
Publicly, the president dismissed the use of nuclear weapons, stating during a July 27
press conference that he was not considering using atomic weapons.42 The administration,
however, continued to quietly explore those situations where nuclear weapons could be
employed. The two most likely scenarios involved using nuclear weapons to cover the
evacuation of United Nations forces in the event of retreat, and, to counter the intervention by
Chinese forces.43 A review of options by the Office of Chinese Affairs also determined that if
significant reinforcements could not be obtained to counter Chinese intervention, then strategic
bombing of China, including the use of nuclear weapons would be necessary. The office further
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concluded that chemical weapons should be used tactically against Chinese troops. The use of
nuclear weapons, however, was not believed to be a deterrent to Soviet intervention.44
The administration’s belief that China would be restrained by the Soviets from
intervening had clearly reversed by November, and concerns were increasing that China, and
even the Soviet Union, might intercede. A successful offensive into North Korea by United
Nations forces could trigger a reaction from China or the Soviet Union.45 To offset Chinese
intervention, Paul Nitze, the Director of Policy Planning, raised the prospect that nuclear
weapons could be used tactically against strictly military targets. The director felt that nuclear
weapons used in this manner would avoid large scale civilian casualties. Strategic attacks, he
argued, contained the risk of high civilian casualties, and would assuredly bring about Soviet
intervention.46
In spite of the risk of provoking Chinese intervention, the war was prosecuted under a
United Nations resolution to unify Korea. Landings at Inchon, North Korea, on September 15,
took the North Koreans by surprise. With a large enemy presence in their rear, the North
Koreans retreated. By mid-October, United Nations forces had not only retaken South Korea,
but occupied a majority of North Korea.47 As United Nations forces drove north and approached
the border between China and North Korea, they encountered increasing signs that the Chinese
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military had a significant presence in the area. MacArthur chose to dismiss concerns from both
his subordinate officers and the White House warning of the threat of Chinese intervention.48
The administration’s understanding by November was that nuclear weapons should only
be used in militarily desperate situations, and even in such situations, there were few suitable
targets for either tactical or strategic nuclear weapons in China. This understanding also
included recognition that the international community looked upon nuclear weapons as
“America’s monster,” and that using nuclear weapons in Korea would cost the US its moral
position, grant the Soviets a propaganda victory and destroy United Nations unity in Korea. Any
use of nuclear weapons, therefore, would have to include the approval of the United Nations, as
well as the strength of will to endure the political consequences.49

The Korean War: Chinese Intervention

On November 25, 1950, over 300,000 Communist Chinese troops conducted an offensive
along the entire width of the Korean peninsula, achieving near total surprise against United
Nations forces in Korea. Four days later, UN forces were ordered to fall back in full retreat.50
The military situation was very grave. General Omar Bradley felt that UN forces would suffer a
complete collapse by December 5, while Secretary of Defense General George Marshall

48

Ibid., 364-367, 377-380.
“Memorandum by the Planning Advisor, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson) to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)”, FRUS, 1950 Korea Vol. VII, 1098-1099.
50
Halberstam, 402, 440-441.
49

20

discussed the possibility of a Dunkirk-style evacuation of all forces.51 Truman now faced the
very situation for which it was determined nuclear weapons were necessary for resolution. Army
Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, dispatched to Korea to assess the situation with
MacArthur, reported MacArthur’s opinion that to save the United Nations in Korea, the US
policy prohibiting attacks on China would have to change, and the utilization of nuclear weapons
was a distinct possibility.52
It was in the midst of the growing crisis that Truman himself unwittingly unleashed a
flurry of negative publicity over nuclear weapons. During a November 30 press conference
addressing the crisis in Korea, a reporter asked Truman if atomic bombs would be used. His
vague responses led to a series of questions about nuclear weapons, ending with Truman stating
that nuclear weapons had always been a consideration.53 Realizing the potential reaction to his
statement, Truman’s staff attempted to clarify that consideration did not mean utilization. It was
too late, though, as there was an immediate outcry from both the American public and the
international community.54 England and the European nations led a vocal protest in the United
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Nations, while most Asian and African nations followed suit. All argued that nuclear weapons in
Korea had little military value and risked escalation with the Soviet Union.55
As a direct result of the president’s statements, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee,
with the full support of the British government, cabled Washington to request an immediate
meeting over the situation, in which Truman agreed. Over the course of the December meeting,
Attlee requested that the United States end its conflict with China and for Great Britain to have a
participatory role in future considerations to use nuclear weapons. Truman was adamant that he
would not commit the United States to any agreement limiting his authority to use nuclear
weapons. The two leaders agreed to issue a communique stressing that they hoped nuclear
weapons would not be needed, and that Truman would inform Attlee of American intentions.56
As the situation unfolded on the Korean peninsula, MacArthur desperately called for
expanding military operations to include the Chinese mainland. Among his requests were for air
attacks on the Chinese mainland, a naval blockade of China, more reinforcements, and nuclear
strikes in North Korea. Upon hearing of Truman’s remarks at the November press briefing,
MacArthur quickly notified the Air Force Far East Commander, General George Stratemeyer,
and presented a list of twenty-six desired targets for nuclear strikes within both China and the
Soviet Union.57 LeMay, though he believed the administration would not use nuclear weapons,
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ordered special radar units shipped to Korea to establish radar coverage of probable targets for
atomic bombing.58
The JCS, however, had become concerned with what it thought was an increased chance
of general war. The small size of the nuclear stockpile became a restricting factor on American
military actions. Nuclear weapons were not to be used in Korea when they might be needed later
should the conflict escalate. MacArthur received orders to conduct a fighting retreat on the
Korean peninsula, with the goal of grinding down the Chinese offensive. The JCS felt they
could stop the offensive and remain in Korea, but, should the military situation become dire,
United Nations forces would be evacuated from the peninsula rather than engage in further
escalation.59
The lack of tactical capability, the small size of the stockpile and the negative reactions
from American allies forced the administration to conclude that nuclear weapons had no useful
purpose in the Korean theater. As a result, United Nations forces had to rely on conventional
military strength to stop the Chinese advance. It took nearly two months for Allied forces to
stabilize the military situation. By the end of January, 1951, the Chinese advance had been
halted, but not before China had retaken all of North Korea and the northernmost fifty miles of
South Korea.60
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The Korean War: Final Nuclear Considerations

Two months later, the Truman Administration, for the last time, gave serious
consideration to the use of nuclear weapons in Korea. By early April 1951, United Nations
forces had recaptured South Korea and pushed the Chinese back to the 38th parallel.61 The JCS
was alarmed, however, by an apparent troop buildup in China, just north of the Chinese-North
Korean border on the Yalu River. A request to transfer custody of nuclear weapons from the
civilian Atomic Energy Commission to the military was forwarded to the president. Truman
approved the transfer, but why he agreed to do so are not entirely clear, and some historians have
proposed that the transfer was granted to solve a problem Truman had with MacArthur.
MacArthur had made controversial statements regarding Korea for several months, but
during March of 1951, he had made several public comments disparaging of the American
military leadership. According to Truman and Dean Acheson, this is the reason why he was
removed from his command by Truman and the JCS on April 11.62 Some historians, however,
have identified the role the transfer of nuclear weapons played in securing MacArthur’s
dismissal. By giving the military custody of a few atomic bombs, Truman purchased
cooperation from the JCS in relieving MacArthur of his command.63
The weapons that had been transported to Guam in July 1950 were transferred to military
control on April 24. The understanding between field commanders in Korea and SAC was that
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the weapons could not be used without a direct order from the JCS. By November, LeMay
requested that the nine nuclear weapons be returned to the United States. Truman may have
been willing to grant the military those weapons because he had already concluded, as he told
Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Gordon Dean, that he would not use nuclear weapons in
North Korea.64 In the end, the only benefit Truman gained from nuclear weapons was the
removal of the recalcitrant MacArthur.
For the rest of his term, Truman did not actively consider the use of nuclear weapons
against the Chinese or North Koreans. The administration did, however, continue to seek new
methods of using nuclear weapons through threats, if not actual utilization. Twice, once during
1951 and once during 1952, the administration considered or acted on threatening to use nuclear
weapons against the Chinese and North Koreans in an effort to force those two nations to
concede the war. In late 1951, the air force conducted Operation Hudson Harbor, using solitary
B-29 bombers to conduct simulated nuclear attacks on North Korean cities. In addition to the
intimidation value of such attacks, Operation Hudson Harbor was part of the JCS study of
tactical nuclear weapons and determined there was a higher level of difficulty in using tactical
nuclear weapons in Korea, concluding that such weapons would, most likely, have little military
effect.65 The second attempt at threatening nuclear attack was the product of the State
Department. In 1952, the department proposed spreading rumors that the president was under
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tremendous domestic pressure to end the war and that nuclear weapons were his only option.66
Unlike Operation Hudson Harbor, the State Department plan was never implemented.
Historians seldom look at Truman’s Korean War nuclear policy in the light of tactical
nuclear doctrine. It could be reasoned that this is so because viable tactical weapons did not exist
during the Truman Administration. A lack of hardware or doctrine, however, does not mean
there was a lack of influence. What this chapter demonstrates is that the absence of tactical
capability factored considerably into the Truman Administration’s decision not to use nuclear
weapons in the Korean theater of operations.
The evidence is clear that Truman and his advisors sought different ways in which they
could employ nuclear weapons in Korea, including tactical applications. Deterrence, strategic
applications against the Soviets and the Chinese, and tactical applications against the Chinese
and North Koreans, were all considered within the first ten months of the war. Yet, by April
1952, the administration had eliminated actual use of nuclear weapons as an option and relegated
nuclear policy in Korea to bluffing its way through empty threats via Operation Hudson Harbor.
The inability of the US military to effectively use tactical nuclear weapons impacted
American policy in three distinct ways. First is the practical reason that the United States only
had one model of nuclear weapon in its inventory through April, 1951. The Mark 4 atomic
bomb was a purely strategic weapon which the JCS and the USAF had determined would fail if
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applied to direct battlefield use. The inventory did expand and grow more diverse as the war
progressed, with the Mark 6 weapons entering into service by July, 1951, and the B5 bomb
beginning production in May 1952.67 By then, however, the Truman Administration had ruled
out nuclear weapons use in Korea in order to preserve the international alliance.
Second, from the political and strategic viewpoints, using a weapons system that would
fail to achieve its primary objectives would damage the reputation and credibility of that system,
in this case nuclear weapons. The administration feared that failure of strategic nuclear weapons
employed in the tactical role would significantly harm the value of these weapons as a strategic
deterrent. It was better not to use those weapons and avoid highlighting their shortcomings, than
to use them to no effect and damage their reputation in the international community as a strategic
deterrent.
Third, in 1950 through 1951, the United States nuclear stockpile remained very small
consisting of only three hundred weapons. The JCS worried that should Korea escalate into a
larger conflict they would need all of those weapons for use against the Soviet Union. Using
these weapons tactically in Korea, aside from not being effective, would also diminish the United
States’ ability to conduct nuclear operations against what the JCS perceived to be the more
threatening enemy, the Soviets.
The three factors mentioned above, all stemming from the lack of tactical capability,
provide the military logic for not using nuclear weapons in Korea. There also existed a strictly
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political logic that worked against using nuclear weapons. This logic originated from the
overwhelming international resistance to nuclear weapons from America’s allies. This resistance
was so strong as to lead one ally, Great Britain, to actually seek to control American nuclear
policy. While this attempt failed, it illustrated to Truman that nuclear weapons could endanger
the political cohesion of the allied coalition in Korea. Keeping the United Nations military
alliance together surpassed the military necessities on the Korean peninsula as a priority.
Truman’s decision to abandon Korea, if the UN military could not hold the peninsula, rather than
use nuclear weapons in an attempt to save the situation, illustrates the high priority he held for
keeping the alliance together.
Of the three administrations in this study, the Truman Administration represents a unique
case in that the influence of tactical nuclear weapons in China policy stems from the nonexistence of those very weapons. That the US nuclear inventory was exclusively strategic during
the early days of the Korean War and that such weapons were unsuitable for battlefield use was a
major factor for why nuclear weapons were not used. Though considered and explored by the
Truman Administration, tactical nuclear weapons were ultimately removed from policy
considerations. As the war progressed, the need to preserve the cooperation of American allies
in Korea overtook the military considerations, so, when tactical weapons eventually became
available toward the end of the Truman Administration, they were no longer an option. The
height of reasoning against nuclear weapons occurred during December 1950 and January 1951,
when the lack of tactical capability overlapped with the resounding and increasing international
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outcry against nuclear weapons, combined to steer the Truman Administration to remove nuclear
weapons from consideration, no matter how dire the situation in Korea.
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CHAPTER TWO: EISENHOWER AND THE END OF THE KOREAN
WAR
By November 1952, the Korean War had lasted over twenty-nine months. The early
optimism exhibited following MacArthur’s surprisingly successful advances in October 1950
was lost when the Chinese entered the war and drove back United Nations forces. Since the
Chinese intervention, the Korean front had changed little from the pre-war boundary between
North and South Korea. The end of 1952, however, brought change in American leadership.
The democrats lost the 1952 presidential election to Dwight Eisenhower, the former Allied
Commander in Europe during World War Two. Eisenhower won a clear victory against his
opponent, Adlai Stevenson, following the 1952 presidential campaign in which both anticommunism and the Korean War were major issues.68 Eisenhower would oversee a fundamental
shift in nuclear weapons policy by placing tactical nuclear weapons at the center of any given
military situation between Communist China and the United States. The Korean War was the
first of a series of crises with China during the Eisenhower Administration in which tactical
nuclear weapons would become essential to policy.
Historians often focus their interpretations of Eisenhower policies on the strategic impact
of nuclear weapons and their role in international policy. Joseph Gerson, for example, argues
that the intent of Eisenhower’s massive retaliation policy was to elevate any conflict to a
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strategic level and use the United States nuclear arsenal as leverage against any potential
adversary.69 Kurt Gottfried and Bruce Blair direct their arguments entirely on Eisenhower’s use
of strategic nuclear weapons, the US relationship with the Soviet Union and the stabilizing
effects of strategic nuclear weapons.70 The research in this chapter will illustrate how tactical
nuclear weapons rose in prominence as a policy tool for use against China, primarily through the
defense of Korea. The president sought to use nuclear weapons to end a limited war against
China, and not for deterrence. In considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons, Eisenhower
found himself between American allies, who resisted the use of nuclear weapons, and the
American military, which wanted to use nuclear weapons in a general war with China.
Unlike Truman, Eisenhower entered the presidency with a considerable amount of
knowledge regarding nuclear weapons. He was first briefed on the atomic bomb in 1945 and its
pending use against Japan. At that time, Eisenhower opposed using the weapon on the grounds
that he believed Japan was already defeated and that such an action would shock the world and
generate negative reactions aimed against the United States.71 When he learned in 1948 that US
nuclear readiness was lacking, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Eisenhower ordered
increased preparedness training as well as streamlining the process of releasing nuclear weapons
for deployment. In July 1949, as the Chief of Staff for the Army, Eisenhower was present when
Truman announced that nuclear arms control would never work, and as a result, the United
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States would need to maintain an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons.72 Finally, as the
first commander of NATO, he was briefed by members of Cal-Tech’s Project Vista about the
possibilities of using tactical nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe.73
For Eisenhower, tactical nuclear weapons represented an element of what he called the
economics of national security.74 A nuclear armed military unit could project considerably more
power and capability than an equivalent unit armed only with conventional weapons. This
aspect made nuclear weapons militarily and economically superior to conventional weapons.75
Eisenhower also recognized that the method of warfighting had changed, and he felt the methods
used successfully during World War Two were no longer adequate in the post-war era. Allowing
the enemy to overrun territory that could be liberated later was no longer an acceptable form of
defense policy. In the event of war, all of a nation’s combat assets would be committed,
including atomic weapons.76 Eisenhower would enter his presidency with a clear and distinct
belief that nuclear weapons, particularly tactical weapons, represented a core element of the postWorld War Two military.
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, suggested that the key to ending the
war lay in dealing directly with the Soviet Union. Dulles did not think of China as just another
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satellite of the Soviet Union. “The Soviet Union cannot impose its will on Communist China in
the same arbitrary way that it imposes its will on Poland or Rumania, etc,” Dulles wrote the
president in late 1952. The secretary recognized that China relented to the Soviet Union by
choice and felt that ending the conflict would rely not on addressing the local situation in Korea
but on the overall situation in Southeast Asia. From Dulles’ perspective, the Korean War
represented an opportunity for the Soviets to bog down American efforts and resources
regionally, and even globally. Dulles also believed that re-unification of Korea under Rhee
would not be practicable and that the post-war situation should revert back to the original
boundaries of a divided Korea. Dulles advised Eisenhower to tell Rhee that re-unification of
Korea was important to US interests, but that the US would never risk a third world war to
achieve it.77
Further advice came from the former commander of United Nations forces in Korea,
General Douglas MacArthur. He too argued that the US deal exclusively with the Soviets and
negotiate to reunify not just Korea, but Germany under a popularly elected government, and to
remove all foreign troops from Korea, Germany, Japan, and Austria. If these terms were not
met, then the United States should use nuclear weapons to clear North Korea of North Korean
and Chinese troops and to use radioactive fallout to render parts of Korea inhabitable.
Additionally, China itself should be attacked in order to deprive it of its industrial base and
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supply lines from the Soviets.78 Eisenhower, in his memoirs, cited this letter to illustrate the
necessity of using nuclear weapons if a major offensive were to be required to break the
stalemate on the Korean peninsula.79 At the end of 1952, however, the United States possessed a
limited supply of tactical nuclear weapons, all of which had been deployed to Europe.80
Furthermore, MacArthur’s proposal of what essentially amounted to establishing a permanent,
radioactive wasteland in Korea goes far beyond tactical, or even strategic, battlefield necessity.
Eisenhower only mentioned MacArthur’s suggestion for the use of nuclear weapons, and omitted
any reference to the use of fallout against the enemy.81
Eisenhower announced changes in Korean policy during his State of the Union address
on February 2, 1953, beginning with the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet, which had been
stationed between Taiwan and China since Truman ordered it there shortly after the outbreak of
the Korean War in 1950. According to Eisenhower, the presence of the fleet, originally deployed
to stop a Chinese attack on Taiwan, and a Nationalist attack on China, served to protect China.
The withdrawal of the fleet put the Chinese on notice that the war would either end or expand
into China itself.82 In coordination with the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet, the USAF
conducted one of its largest air raids against North Korea.83
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The Korean War: Planning for the End

In considering US actions to end the Korean War, Eisenhower quickly raised the prospect
of using tactical nuclear weapons. One week after the State of the Union address, the president
was informed of a troop buildup within the Kaesong sanctuary (established during previous
armistice negotiations, the sanctuary was an area in which the allies agreed not to attack).
General Mark Clark believed that this was a prelude to offensive operations by the Chinese.
Secretary of State Dulles asked if it was time to no longer respect the boundaries of the
sanctuary, which the president agreed. The president then elaborated that the military situation
within the sanctuary provided an ideal situation to use tactical nuclear weapons. Dulles added
that there were moral implications and restrictions on using nuclear weapons, explaining that the
Soviets had successfully cast nuclear weapons as a separate category of weapon from
conventional weapons and that the United States should try to “break down this false
distinction.” The president then stated that if the Allies objected to the use of nuclear weapons,
then perhaps they could contribute three more divisions to the Korean theater of operations.84
During this meeting both the president and the secretary of state revealed a key element about
their beliefs on the role of nuclear weapons in policy. That belief was that tactical applications
for nuclear weapons bore no distinction from the tactical use of conventional weapons. Both
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men also recognized that the international community did not share this same belief, and that any
policy decision using nuclear weapons would have to overcome this discrepancy.
As new weapon designs became operational and the nuclear stockpile grew, the military
overcame its earlier concerns under Truman regarding the effectiveness of nuclear weapons and
thoroughly endorsed the necessity of nuclear weapons for any attempt to expand the war outside
of Korea. Two of the three attending generals at the March 27, NSC meeting, advocated for the
use of nuclear weapons, with USAF General Hoyt Vandenberg stating that they would be most
effective against Chinese bases in Manchuria. Only Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton
Collins dissented, questioning the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in Korea and pointing out
that United States forces were vulnerable to nuclear attack both at Pusan and in Japan.85
General Collins’ opinion represented a minority within the Eisenhower Administration.
Even civilian advisors endorsed using nuclear weapons in Korea. An advisory committee
created to review American options and explore the economic ramifications of US policy in
Korea generally favored the use of nuclear weapons to end the Korean War. Members of the
committee felt the American public would tolerate the use of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower was
well aware that the opinions of American allies did not match those of his administration. Nor
did he think that those opinions should be ignored, or that the United States should act
unilaterally on the issue. The president felt that American allies had a right to be concerned,
given that those allies, especially the European nations, thought of themselves as caught between
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the United States and the Soviet Union. This attitude prohibited American use of nuclear
weapons, and without nuclear weapons, the United States military options were severely limited.
Both Eisenhower and Dulles agreed that the US needed to “make every effort to eliminate this
attitude.”86
By May 1953, the administration had narrowed down its military choices for ending the
Korean War to two options, with each option containing three separate methods of execution.
The first option called for increased pressure on the Chinese and North Koreans within Korea.
The second option increased pressure on the Chinese and North Koreans by expanding the war
outside of the Korean peninsula. These options did not specifically mention the use of nuclear
weapons, but an analysis conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence
Advisory Committee calculated that using nuclear weapons would demonstrate to the Chinese
and Soviets the Western determination to prosecute the war to a conclusion. This by itself, the
CIA felt, would not guarantee concessions from the Chinese. The intelligence service added that
communist reaction to nuclear attack would depend on the amount of damage incurred from such
attacks.87
As the NSC continued to address the Korean War, the president re-iterated his belief in
the necessity of using nuclear weapons and the need to break down resistance to nuclear
weapons. In early May, the president stated that he had reached the conclusion that the atomic
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bomb was simply another weapon in the American arsenal.88 The military felt that operations
outside Korea would require nuclear weapons, while the JCS stated that in order to be effective,
the US would have to use several nuclear weapons, and that there were no good strategic targets
within Korea. The president disagreed about targets in Korea, stating he was not convinced that
the weapons would be ineffective. Discussion then centered on the reactions of American allies,
with Eisenhower asking what would happen between the US and its Allies. Secretary Smith
answered that NATA (North Atlantic Treaty Alliance) would “temporarily go to pieces,” but if
the situation in Korea could be resolved and general war avoided, those relationships with other
countries could be rebuilt. The president responded that the US needed its allies for defense and
that he did not want these allies to desert the United States.89 This, of course, placed Eisenhower
in the same predicament as Truman. The president felt that nuclear weapons were necessary to
end the war, but, by using nuclear weapons, the United States would lose the cooperation of its
allies.
By the end of May, the JCS concluded if the war could not end through diplomatic
efforts, then it would have to expand outside Korea. A key component of this expansion was the
destruction of the entire Chinese air force. The president agreed and emphasized the necessity of
expanding the war and that nuclear weapons were necessary in order to obtain a favorable end to
the war. Expanding the war contained risks and Eisenhower worried that escalating the conflict
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would place Japan in a position vulnerable to Soviet attack, or that general war would break out
between the Soviet Union and the United States. 90 These concerns did not dissuade Eisenhower
from his belief that nuclear action represented the best plan “if circumstances arose which would
force the United States to expand the war.” The president suggested that May 1954 be set as the
target date for increasing the military pressure on Korea and China.91 But the war ended in July
1953, and the nuclear offensive was not needed.
There is a disparity between historians and Eisenhower over what influence nuclear
weapons held in ending the Korean War. The president credited what he defined as a series of
nuclear threats levied against China in the last days of May and the first days of June. According
to Eisenhower, these threats were delivered discretely through diplomatic contacts in India;
threats that Eisenhower claimed in his memoirs reached both the Chinese and Soviets.92 John
Foster Dulles, also made such an assertion in a 1956 interview with Life magazine, claiming to
have expressed a nuclear threat to China in May 1953, transmitted by the leader of India,
Jawaharlal Nehru.93
Evidence to support these assertions, however, has been lacking, or even refuted. Nehru,
for example, denied any role in delivering a message from Dulles to the Chinese.94 A message
delivered by US ambassador Bohlen to the Soviets regarding the expansion of the war has been
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seen as too vague to carry a nuclear threat, and is interpreted more as a request of the Soviets to
pressure China into ending the war.95 Few historians give much credit to the threat of nuclear
attack as more than a peripheral cause for the end of the Korean War.96
Instead of Eisenhower’s nuclear threats, most historians cite the death of Stalin in March,
1953, followed by a change in Soviet policies as holding the most influence over the end of the
war.97 Other factors include deteriorating North Korean morale and the USAF strategic bombing
campaign against North Korean cities.98 Historian Rosemary Foot also identifies a perception
amongst the Chinese leadership that Eisenhower’s election represented a considerable shift in
American policy toward a more aggressive stance against China.99
Threats of nuclear attack can come in various forms other than through diplomatic
channels, and from the Chinese perspective, the United States appeared to be very belligerent
with non-diplomatic nuclear threats throughout the war. During the Truman Administration, the
air force conducted Operation Hudson Harbor, in which single aircraft flew unarmed bombing
sorties over North Korean cities imitating the flight procedure for nuclear weapon delivery.
During both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, the United States engaged in
extensive nuclear testing, much of which was both public and heavily involved in tactical
development. Even while American policy makers discussed the merits of utilizing tactical
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nuclear weapons in Korea, the national press made very public associations between the nuclear
testing program and the potential for use on the Korean peninsula. The Chinese leadership paid
close attention to these nuclear testing activities. Information from American nuclear tests
alarmed the Chinese in that the rhetoric and publicity regarding the tests seemed to indicate the
US was moving closer to using nuclear weapons on the battlefield, yet, the very same
information revealed that certain precautions taken by the Chinese (fortification and troop
dispersion) would help to protect ground forces from nuclear attack.100
The credibility of any nuclear threat hinges on the known ability to carry out such threats.
US tactical capability remained limited throughout the Korean War. The much vaunted atomic
cannon did not conduct its first test until May 25, 1953, and even then, was widely considered to
be an ineffective weapons system. Furthermore, the few tactical nuclear bombs available were
deployed to Europe, and therefore not available for use in Asia.101 The Chinese government also
felt that the threat of Soviet nuclear retaliation would restrain the United States.102 The factors
mentioned above helped to diminish the efficacy of nuclear threats from the United States.
Chinese leadership did not consider an American nuclear attack a likely possibility, but instead
feared an amphibious assault on mainland China as more probable.103
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The New Look and Massive Retaliation
During Eisenhower’s first State of the Union address, he unveiled a new military policy
designed to keep American armed forces modern and capable while still economical. The
president reorganized the military’s higher ranks and added the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Director of the Budget and the Director of the United States Information Agency to the National
Security Council. Admiral Arthur W. Radford was appointed as the new Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The focus on policy would build a military that Eisenhower described as
“adequate” for the defense requirements of the United States, but without “extravagance.”104
The president saw technology as a means of keeping the US military a formidable force that
could economically maintain national security and honor its overseas commitments. The
Department of Defense would focus on the most modern weaponry in an effort to prevent the US
military from falling behind in technical prowess.105
To reduce the extravagance of large, expensive militaries and provide the most efficient
counterforce possible, nuclear weapons were to be incorporated into US strategy. Tactical
nuclear weapons were widely believed to be effective at countering the extremely large armies
fielded by the Soviet Union and China, thus they would be incorporated into divisional-level
tactics of the army, a practice called the pentomic military. The prevailing thought behind
tactical battlefield warfare dictated that ground armies would deploy smaller, mobile, nucleararmed units. By relying on tactical nuclear weapons, the army’s personnel requirements could
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be significantly reduced, in theory.106 Since aerial delivery of nuclear weapons was the dominant
means of deployment, the USAF was given modest increases in both money and personnel.107
Because of the pentomic military, much of the budget cuts were directed at the army, which lost
nearly a third of its funding in 1953, as well as reduction in personnel.108
Often associated with Eisenhower’s military reform is the strategic doctrine of Massive
Retaliation. The term originates from a speech by Secretary Dulles when he stated that the
United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons, at its discretion, for “massive retaliatory
power” to counter Communist aggression throughout the world. Since that moment, historians
have often tied the doctrine of Massive Retaliation with the military modernization policy of the
New Look, stating that both were part of a strategic policy of deterrence aimed at the Soviet
Union.109 More recently, historians such as Campbell Craig have evolved an interpretation that
Massive Retaliation was a policy of war avoidance that attached the risk of general war to any
limited war scenario, the greatest effect being that the United States military was denied the
ability to fight in small war situations.110 This is the exact opposite of what some earlier
historians such as Gerson argue, that by linking general war to limited war, the opponents of the
United States would be “nuclear-blackmailed” into conceding the issue.111
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These interpretations are built on the assumption that all nuclear weapons are the same,
and that there is no distinction within the role or missions of strategic or tactical nuclear
weapons. As seen in this chapter and the next, President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles
clearly believed in a distinction between tactical and strategic weapons and this reflects in the
actions and policies that were undertaken. The greatest consequence of Eisenhower’s belief in
the power of tactical weapons was the creation of the New Look policy and the pentomic
military. The creation of the pentomic military represents the single-most influential factor
behind the United States’ subsequent nuclear threats against China because it made the pentomic
military the only military option available to confront China.
Instead of a product designed to avoid war, the pentomic military was meant to assure
that the United States military could successfully obtain its objectives, whether that be defense
commitments, or in the case of Korea, preventing the loss of the Korean peninsula. Several
times during the first months of 1953, Eisenhower, Dulles and a majority of the administration
believed nuclear weapons were the only practical military solution available to the United States
that would guarantee a successful outcome in a conflict with China over Korea. Both
Eisenhower and Dulles preferred that nuclear weapons be used in a limited, tactical capacity, and
conflicted with members of their administration that argued for strategic nuclear warfare against
China.
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Preparing for a Second Korean War

In October, 1953, with the armistice only three months old, the administration was
already considering its options should the cease-fire fail. Nuclear weapons were again
recognized as a key and necessary component to any military action on the peninsula, either as a
means of securing an evacuation of friendly forces or to halt a Chinese offensive. The concerns
of the administration over using nuclear weapons in Korea echoed those previously mentioned
during the war. Would the United States’ allies understand the US position and the necessity for
using nuclear weapons and would the Soviets respond with their own nuclear strikes in Korea
and Japan? Though there had been no formal discussion with the United States allies on the use
of nuclear weapons against China in a situation of renewed hostility, John Dulles felt the
American allies would, in this case, understand the US position on using nuclear weapons.112
Eisenhower had his reservations about the allies’ acceptance of US nuclear policy and thought
they had yet to “fully grasp the import of atomic warfare,” even though, in his opinion, the
American public had accepted the reality of nuclear war. Dulles’ solution to overcoming allied
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resistance to nuclear weapons was that the United States should share nuclear technology and
weapons.113
The administration’s concerns prompted contingency planning for a renewed Korean
war. As part of that planning, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson requested preauthorization to use nuclear weapons should it be deemed necessary. The secretary also sought
immediate permission to begin planning for a regional nuclear war in Southeast Asia, requesting
a list of strategic targets in Manchuria. 114 While the JCS and Wilson may have thought the
extensive use of nuclear weapons was a military necessity, there were dissenting opinions from
the State Department.
After analyzing the JCS proposal, the Director of Policy Planning, Robert Richardson
Bowie, criticized the JCS plan as too vague and worried that nuclear attacks on Manchuria would
back the Soviets into nuclear retaliation against United Nations forces in Korea or Japan.115
Secretary Dulles also raised his concerns with the JCS plan. The JCS plan for renewed warfare
in Korea very much resembled the JCS plan for ending the stalemate earlier that year. That plan
called for nuclear strikes on both tactical and strategic targets throughout Korea and mainland
China. Dulles objected that the JSC plan involved general war with China, and even the Soviet
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Union, the results of which would place the United States in an extremely isolated position with
the rest of the world, as well as endangering a major US ally in the Pacific, Japan. The secretary
also thought the JCS plan would have threatening implications for the French in Indochina. He
felt the Chinese would send aid and personnel into that region to fight the French as a retaliatory
measure against the United States.116
Dulles had his own plan for dealing with China, and it too, involved nuclear strikes.
Unlike the JCS plan, however, Dulles’ plan limited nuclear strikes to the Korean peninsula as
well as the seizure of the offshore islands (including Hainan) and the blockade of the Chinese
coast. The Secretary of State argued that what the JCS wanted was a “total victory” over China,
and the JCS plan automatically assumed general war from the beginning. If fighting were to
occur in Korea, Dulles wanted to fight for victory in Korea, not over China. Furthermore, Dulles
saw dangers in the JCS plan, in allowing the military to decide before a crisis that it would fight
a general war.117 The secretary was also wary of Wilson’s request for pre-delegation. He
worried that a field commander would conduct a nuclear strike without presidential
authorization. The president’s response to these concerns was quite clear. Orders for nuclear
strikes could only come from Washington, and not by a field commander. Eisenhower was
adamant there would be limitations on the use of nuclear weapons. Such weapons would not be
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used for small incursions and border incidents, but would be reserved for a major attack by the
Chinese. 118
Eisenhower claimed not to have seen much difference between the JCS plan and Dulles’
plan, just that the goals were different. The president focused his attention on not wanting to
repeat the experience from a year earlier, when the military fought in Korea under several
operational constraints such as restrictive rules of engagements and sanctuaries from attack. The
JCS plan was much more aggressive and Eisenhower favored that one out of the two plans.119
This is a telling exchange within the NCS, and reveals much about Secretary Dulles’
thinking regarding nuclear weapons. The State Department plan presented by Dulles used
nuclear weapons, just as the JCS plan. The Dulles plan differed from the JCS plan by the
considerable reduction of the nuclear deployment. Instead of extensive attacks on Korea and
much of China, as the JCS envisaged, the Dulles plan limited nuclear strikes to the Korean
peninsula alone. Even Dulles’ employment of conventional forces left much of China untouched
(with the exception of Hainan), resorting instead to seizing islands and blockading the coast.
The contingency planning for post-Korean War hostilities reveals again how Eisenhower
believed that nuclear weapons represented the only option for confronting China without
escalating a limited war scenario to general war. The discussion over these plans also revealed
the conflict between the president and the US military regarding the intensity of any nuclear
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response. The military favored widespread strategic attacks geared toward general war.
Eisenhower, along with Dulles, continued to favor a very limited application of nuclear weapons,
essentially a tactical application, focused more on winning a brief, localized engagement and
avoiding general war or retaliatory attacks against Japan or the French in Indochina. These
discussions also illustrate the continuing struggle to cope with allied rejection of American
nuclear policy. Though Eisenhower may have believed and wanted tactical nuclear weapons to
be viewed as just another conventional weapon in the American inventory, he did not treat them
as such, as seen by his refusal to allow pre-delegation for nuclear weapons use, and his insistence
on maintaining tight control over when, where and how to use nuclear weapons.
Throughout the Korean War, outwardly, tactical nuclear weapons wielded little influence
in military policy or ending the war. Behind the scenes, however, nuclear weapons dominated
discussions on how to end the war, and afterwards on how to fight the Chinese in a renewed
Korean War. Nuclear weapons presented a challenging dichotomy for the Eisenhower
Administration. In the president’s opinion, nuclear weapons were required for any successful
military conclusion to the Korean War. Yet, using nuclear weapons threatened to destroy the
allied alliance and risked general war with the Soviet Union. Acutely aware of allied attitudes
against both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the administration found itself constrained
far more by its allies than any technological issues, or even any reprisals from the Soviet Union.
Eisenhower refused to act against these attitudes, placing the cooperation of the allies
over the military considerations for ending the war. The president deemed the political cost of
using nuclear weapons too high. Having the European alliance “go to pieces” as Secretary Smith
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described it, at the very moment when the United States could find itself fighting general war
with the Soviet Union was a scenario Eisenhower refused to risk. As Eisenhower succinctly
stated, the United States needed it allies, and refraining from using nuclear weapons and possibly
extending the war for more than a year was the price for keeping those allies.
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CHAPTER THREE: EISENHOWER FACES CRISIS AND
CONFRONTATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS
Historians, in general, define Eisenhower’s nuclear policy in terms of strategic deterrence
against a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Even when tactical nuclear weapons are acknowledged,
they are mostly placed in a context subordinate to strategic applications. Nina Tannenwald, for
example, argues that the Eisenhower Administration’s creation of the pentomic military, the
incorporation of tactical weapons into military policy, the threat to use tactical nuclear weapons
and the subsequent effort to convince the American people that nuclear weapons were no
different than conventional weapons, was an attempt to generate support and credibility for a
strategic policy of massive retaliation directed at the Soviet Union.120 Instead, this chapter will
demonstrate that Eisenhower’s consideration to use nuclear weapons against China was derived
from the combination of choices to contain China and the creation of the pentomic military. The
ultimate goal in confronting China with nuclear weapons was to assert regional control over the
Taiwan Straits area rather than for strategic factors directed at the Soviet Union.

Laying the Groundwork for Nuclear Confrontation: Establishing a China Policy

The Communist victory in the Chinese civil war and the rise of Mao-Zedong created a
strong, centrally controlled government in China. The Eisenhower Administration felt the
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Chinese government, acting under the heavy influence of nationalism and communism, would
compel Communist China to eventually make attempts to reclaim historically Chinese territories
that allies of the U.S. held or protected.121 Concerned over the influence of China on the Asian
continent, US policymakers believed that the United States would have to maintain a permanent
presence in Asia.122
The relationship between the Soviet Union and China further complicated efforts to
construct a policy. In 1950, Mao Zedong aligned the People’s Republic of China with the Soviet
Union, forming the Sino-Soviet Alliance. The president and Dulles knew that there was little
common ideological ground between the Soviet Union and the Peoples’ Republic of China.
Furthermore, the president did not believe in the imminent threat of the Chinese being dominated
by the Soviet Union.123 Discord between the two nations represented the greatest threat to the
Sino-Soviet alliance. The administration, however, believed that external threats to the two
communist nations would override any internal issues between them and unify the two
powers.124
The administration settled on a policy of bolstering the non-communist, Asian nations
with economic, political and military aid in an effort to contain the expansion of Chinese
influence. Additionally, the United States would actively seek opportunities to degrade and
impair the Sino-Soviet alliance such as continuing non-recognition of the People’s Republic of
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China in the United Nations while recognizing the Republic of China.125 A mutual defense
treaty was signed with South Korea in 1953, and in September, 1954, a mutual defense
organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, was created. Furthermore, the United
States and the Republic of China initiated the diplomatic process of creating a mutual defense
treaty between the two nations.126
The decision to continue confrontation served as one of the most influential factors
explaining why the Eisenhower Administration undertook active consideration to use nuclear
weapons against China. The administration felt that easing China policy contained the risk of
further conflict with Mao, while direct confrontation with China contained a high political and
military cost. The middle road, containment built upon alliances, provided the most efficient and
economical means of curbing Chinese influence in Asia. These alliances, however, required a
military commitment from the United States. As seen earlier, Eisenhower had turned to nuclear
weapons, tactical nuclear weapons in particular, to make the US military a viable force for
defending the United States and its allies. Reliance on tactical nuclear weapons meant that any
military assistance to an ally, such as the Republic of China during its confrontation with the
People’s Republic of China, would involve the potential for nuclear war.
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The First Taiwan Straits Crisis: Preparations

When Chiang Kai-Shek retreated from mainland China and occupied Taiwan, the
Nationalist military continued to hold a series of tiny islands located in and around the Taiwan
Straits area. Known as the offshore islands, these islands consist of a series of separate and
distinct archipelagos between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. The archipelagoes
most contested between the two sides were the island of Quemoy (of the Quemoy archipelago),
the island of Matsu, and the archipelagos of the Dachens and the Penghus. Quemoy and Matsu
are located very close to the Chinese mainland, especially Quemoy, which resides a mere seven
kilometers from the mainland.127 Chiang Kai-shek placed a high value on the islands for he
hoped to use Quemoy as a jumping-off point in an attempt to retake mainland China.128
Washington preferred to have Chiang defend the islands himself.129 The military was
divided over the strategic importance of the offshore islands. In late July, 1953, the navy
classified Quemoy and Matsu as militarily necessary to the Nationalists for the defense of
Taiwan, while the Dachens were ruled unnecessary.130 The JCS thought differently, and in an
August, 1953 assessment, ruled that the islands were not required for the defense of Taiwan.
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There was universal agreement, however, that the islands possessed considerable political value
and were indispensable to Nationalist morale.131
The administration worried that the offshore islands could become the center of a crisis.
Ambassador to the Republic of China, Karl L. Rankin, in February 1954, expressed his concerns
over not just the islands, but over the administration’s Chinese policy as a whole. Regarding the
islands, Rankin feared that the PRC could use the islands to test the United States’ retaliation
policy. The ambassador felt he had received little information regarding Chinese policy as well
as feared that eventually, Chiang would attack the mainland, and that the PRC would exploit the
issues between the Republic of China and the United States.132 The CIA also identified the
offshore islands as a point through which the PRC could provoke the United States. In its March
National Intelligence Estimate, Communist China was predicted to conduct raids on the offshore
islands, but that its primary efforts against the United States and Taiwan would be economic and
political.133
By the summer of 1954, the administration’s concerns grew to the point that Eisenhower
and the NSA sought to take pre-emptive actions to discourage Chinese attempts to exploit the
islands. Early in June, the president approved a plan that a small portion of the Navy’s Seventh
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Fleet would visit the Dachen Islands, an action specifically intended to communicate to the
People’s Republic of China the United States’ concern regarding the offshore islands.134 During
the August 18 NSC meeting, both China policy and the offshore islands were discussed. Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert Cutler asked if the United States
should extend the parameters of U.S. obligation to defend offshore islands outside the
Pescadores (Penghus). The opinion of the JCS was that all the Nationalist-held islands should be
held. Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Arthur Radford felt that the United States “could not afford
to lose any more ground in the Far East.” Eisenhower’s position was that the United States
should “go as far as possible to defend them without inflaming world opinion against us.” The
Department of Defense was directed to deliver a report by September 29 on U.S. options should
Communist China attack any of the offshore islands.135
An assessment of American policy regarding the offshore islands was compiled by the
State Department on August 20, which determined that the United States was not officially
committed to defending the islands. Nor had the Eisenhower Administration, up to that date,
taken an official stance on the islands. The only official actions taken were the visitation of
members of the Seventh Fleet, once in May, and again on August 19 of that year.136 Less than a
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week later, Dulles issued a statement warning China of possible US action should the offshores
be attacked.137
Just days after the Seventh fleet visited the Dachens, the Taiwanese government
reiterated its concerns over PRC attacks against the offshore islands. Though Chiang had
mentioned the islands before, concern this time coincided with a series of statements from the
PRC calling for the liberation of Taiwan.138 During the month of August, Chiang Kai-Shek
moved 58,000 troops to Quemoy Island and 15,000 troops to Matsu, instantly raising the stakes
of any crisis over the offshore islands.139 Toward the end of August, British Prime Minister
Anthony Eden relayed his concerns through the British embassy that the West faced losing more
prestige over the offshore islands. Apparently worried over the French failure to defeat
communist forces in Indochina, the prime minister stated that England would support a strong
military stand over the islands, but cautioned that such a policy should be flexible in order to
avoid committing the United States to permanently defending the islands.140
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The First Crisis: Hostilities Begin

On September 3, 1954 China initiated an artillery barrage against the main island of the
Quemoy archipelago. The United States gauged Chinese motivations for the attack as ranging
from a full scale invasion of Taiwan, an invasion of the offshore islands, or a test of American
policy. During the first few days of the crisis, the administration struggled to determine the
actual intent of the shelling. Rankin reported that there was risk of an imminent attack on
Quemoy, and the JCS certainly did little to discount that possibility.141 The intelligence
community, however, stood by their original pre-crisis assessment that the People’s Republic of
China was testing American policy.142
The majority of the JCS considered the islands “important but not essential” to the
defense of Taiwan while the minority opinion advocated active participation in the defense of ten
offshore islands, including Quemoy. The JCS was again in agreement that the offshore islands’
political value outweighed any military value (or lack, thereof) and for that reason, the islands
might have to be defended, regardless of their lack of military importance. Military action to
protect Quemoy, in the opinion of the JCS, would require military action against mainland
China.143
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Dulles, too, believed Quemoy should be defended. The secretary was in Manila for a
SEATO organizational meeting and wired back to the United States expressing his opinion that
the island should be defended with American aid, but only if the U.S. deemed it feasible. The
secretary thought the situation in Quemoy could turn into another Dien Bien Phu, where the
French suffered a humiliating and devastating defeat at the hands of communist forces in
Indochina. Dulles saw an opportunity to reverse the prestige gained by Communist China if
Quemoy could be held.144
Prestige or the loss of prestige for the US should the islands fall to the Chinese, was a
driving element of the crisis. The president, then in Denver, recognized and identified the
critical role of the islands in maintaining US prestige during a phone briefing with the UnderSecretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith. Much of the administration agreed with the
CIA’s assessment of Chinese motivation for attacking the island, that Mao was probing
American resolve over Taiwan and the offshore islands. Lack of action on behalf of the United
States, according to the CIA, could lead the People’s Republic of China to proceed with actual
assaults on one or more of the offshore islands.145
The first indication of Soviet reaction over the incident occurred early in October, when
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev spoke from Beijing supporting the Chinese. The
administration, however, dismissed the possibility of the Soviets going to great lengths to
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confront the US over the offshore islands. The American ambassador to the Soviet Union,
Charles E. Bohlen, cabled the day after Khrushchev’s speech stating that he did not think the
Soviets were ready to risk war over the People’s Republic of China or the offshore islands, but
also warned not to take the premier’s statements lightly.146 John Dulles agreed, calling
Khrushchev’s statements “bluster.”147
The administration devised a diplomatic effort, to be initiated in the United Nations by
New Zealand, to demilitarize the islands. Eisenhower, Dulles, other administration members, as
well as the administrations of New Zealand and Great Britain all felt China would reject any
proposal that kept the offshore islands out of reach. Equally as disruptive to the proposal was
Chiang’s refusal to abandon the islands. All parties involved counted on the Mao’s rejection of
the proposal, its real intent to give the United States the moral high ground in the crisis, should
hostilities erupt between the US and China.148
While the State Department pursued the New Zealand proposal, work on the mutual
defense treaty with the Republic of China moved forward. The treaty was signed between the
United States and the Republic of China on December 2, 1954. The provisions of the treaty
included the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghus) and included an ambiguous clause
covering any territory held by the Nationalists and considered strategically important by both
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signatory nations.149 The Nationalists had tried to include most of the offshore islands in the
protective sphere, but the United States would not agree to it.150 Furthermore, the US and the
Republic of China agreed that any major action against the PRC required consultation and
approval from the United States.151
In December, Eisenhower advised the Nationalists against placing more troops on the
offshore islands.152 One month later, communist Chinese forces seized the offshore island of
Yijiangshan, near the Dachens, on January 18, 1955. The next day, Eisenhower presented a plan
to Congress that evacuated the Dachens, but added Quemoy and Matsu to the American defense
perimeter.153 Eight days later, Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, granting the president
the right to use force to defend Taiwan, the Pescadores and any related positions currently held
by the Nationalists.154 The imprecise nature of the resolution gave Eisenhower the leeway to
choose if and when to defend the offshore islands. The US Navy helped to evacuate the
Dachens, and by mid-February, Communist China occupied the island chain.155
At this point, Eisenhower’s China and military policy decisions brought the United States
to the point of actively considering nuclear attacks against China. The United States alliance
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with the Republic of China, particularly the mutual defense treaty, made the Chinese Civil War a
part of American military policy. The doctrine behind the pentomic military required the active
planning, if not actual use, of nuclear weapons for any given situation. Since nuclear weapons
had been integrated into all military operations, no other alternative could have been utilized.
Admiral Radford explained the US positon during the March 10, NSC meeting, “(It was the) JCS
position that nuclear weapons would always have to be used. Our whole military structure is
built around this assumption.”156
Nuclear weapons were deployed to the Far East theater in response to the crisis, and were
integrated into military response planning.157 The JCS ordered the SAC to begin selecting
targets in China.158 The official rules of engagement during those later stages of the crisis
included a retaliatory nuclear strike option. Eisenhower placed an exclusive restriction on this
option, however, prohibiting its use without specific orders from the president himself.159 As the
president had stated before, field commanders would not make nuclear strike decisions.
Controlling nuclear weapons was just one aspect of nuclear policy that the president and
the military would clash over. The JCS favored military action on a strategic scale. Both Dulles
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and Eisenhower believed that any military operation to protect Quemoy, or any of the offshore
islands, required tactical nuclear weapons. The two felt that only the limited application of
nuclear weapons was all that was necessary. Dulles would go so far as to specifically state that
strategic weapons, or what he called weapons of mass destruction, were not necessary for
confronting China.160
While the Eisenhower Administration grappled with potential war with China over the
straits, China would make the first move to end the crisis. During the Bandung Afro-Asian
Conference in April, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai publically stated that China did not
want war with the United States. Eisenhower took advantage of the opportunity, and the United
States and China entered into the Geneva talks, a series of ambassadorial meetings to discuss the
repatriation of nationals and open dialogue with the intention of forestalling future crisis.161

The First Crisis: An Assessment

The causes and resolution of the First Taiwan Straits Crisis remains a debated subject
amongst historians. Many focus on the ambiguity of Eisenhower’s policies, which made no
straightforward commitment either to goals or specific actions. As late as August, 1954, the
administration did not make public any intention to defend the offshore islands. This ambiguity
160
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and lack of vocal commitment, according to Gordon Chang and He Di, had the complete
opposite effect of deterrence and actually encouraged Mao Zedong to continue with operations
against the Dachens as well as the artillery attacks against Quemoy.162 Countering opinions,
such as those of Michael M. Sheng, blame Mao Zedong for underestimating the US commitment
to defend the Republic of China and for taking actions that reinforced opinions in Washington
about the aggressiveness of China.163
Historian H.W. Brands is particularly critical of Eisenhower’s reliance on nuclear
weapons during the straits crisis. According to Brands, Eisenhower’s policy of Massive
Retaliation drove the United States to risk what Brands called national suicide (through
escalation) over interests of limited or no value, such as the offshore islands. Brands
characterizes Eisenhower’s decision making process as a hands-off procrastination, where
Eisenhower waited for events during the Taiwan Straits’ crises to determine the use, or non-use,
of nuclear weapons, rather than making the decision before such crises occurred.164
The decision to defend the offshore islands was driven by fear of the consequences to
American prestige should the islands fall to China. This fear is best illustrated by the
administration’s repeated concerns that the offshore islands could devolve into a repeat of the
humiliating loss of the French at Bien Dien Phu. The administration felt that the loss of the
offshore islands could initiate a chain of events leading to the possible loss of Taiwan, thus
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severely damaging the United States’ reputation as an ally in the Asian region. Loss of prestige
as an ally could embolden Communist China to continue to challenge the US in Asia. In the
eyes of the Eisenhower Administration, therefore, China would have to be confronted over the
Taiwan Straits, otherwise, Communist China would increase its level of hostility toward the
United States.
Once the decision to defend the islands had been made, then the second component of
Eisenhower’s policies wielded its influence. By defending the islands, the administration had
committed to utilizing the military. In 1954, the pentomic divisional structure was still being
implemented, but advanced enough along its development that no non-nuclear option was
available. Once committed to defending the offshore islands, the US nuclear element had
become the only considered military option for resolving the crisis.
There is much more agreement amongst historians that US nuclear policy played little
part in resolving the crisis. Since China did not intend to take Quemoy or Matsu, then nuclear
weapons could not have acted as a deterrent to Chinese expansion.165 Jian Chen also argues that
Mao’s goal in the crisis was to emphasize to the world that the situation between China and
Taiwan was a domestic issue, not an international one, and to protest the mutual defense treaty
between the US and Taiwan.166 T.V. Paul argues the role of nuclear weapons in the crisis was
diminished because there was no credibility behind the nuclear threats.167
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The decision to protect American prestige would certainly be called a strategic
consideration, but the military options to protect the offshore islands were clearly aimed to be
limited regionally. The lack of concern over the Soviet Union’s reaction to events in the Taiwan
Straits, and the open dismissal of any potential action by the Soviets, indicates that the
Eisenhower Administration was not worried that the strategic disposition between the US and the
Soviet Union would change over US actions in the Taiwan Straits.
For the Eisenhower Administration, tactical nuclear weapons assured military goals could
be successfully obtained. On repeated occasions before and during the crisis, the administration
felt that only nuclear weapons could defend United States interests. Only nuclear weapons could
protect South Korea from a renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula. Only nuclear weapons
could protect Taiwan and the offshore islands from Chinese invasion. Tactical nuclear weapons
allowed the United States to retain the capability of direct military confrontation, should the
administration choose that option.
The crisis further illustrated the difference of opinion between Eisenhower, Dulles and
the US military over the nature of nuclear weapons in American policy. The US military thought
of nuclear weapons as a weapon to win general war, in this case, overwhelming strategic defeat
of China. The possibility that the US would fight a limited war, for limited goals, seemed to
escape most of the military leadership. For Eisenhower and Dulles, however, tactical nuclear
weapons were a means of achieving regional goals within limited war by applying just enough
force to defeat the Chinese in and around Taiwan and the offshore islands.
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Between the Crises

In the years between the first and second straits crises, the Eisenhower Administration
continued to develop the pentomic military. In the eyes of the administration, the development
and integration of tactical nuclear weapons considerably improved the capability of the US
military, and tactical nuclear weapons were distributed around the world, particularly to Europe,
Asia and the West Pacific.168 Nuclear weapons deployments in Asia rivaled those in Europe.
Regulus nuclear missiles were dispatched to Guam between September and November, 1957. 169
In January, 1958, the USAF’s 17th Tactical Missile Squadron, using Matador missiles armed
with nuclear warheads, arrived in Taiwan. In December, the 310th Tactical Missile Squadron
deployed similarly-armed Matadors in South Korea.170 Honest John nuclear missiles, eight-inch
nuclear howitzer ordinance and the 280mm atomic cannon were also deployed to South Korea.
171

During the months of March and April, the United States conducted joint exercises with the

Republic of China involving live-firing of Matador missiles.172
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Nuclear cooperation with England, a carryover from the Bermuda conference, evolved to
include the development of separate strategic and tactical planning agreements between the
United States and Great Britain.173 The United States continued to conduct nuclear testing to
improve and develop both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.174 Between 1955 and 1957,
the United States conducted 145 nuclear test shots. The vast majority of these tests, 131,
involved weapons development as opposed to civil defense engineering or peaceful applications
of nuclear explosives.175
In addition to the nuclear deployments, meant to act as a deterrent to China, the
administration sought to minimize the risk of Chiang stationing large numbers of troops on the
offshore islands and undertook an effort to convince Chiang to abandon them. In April, 1955,
Admiral Radford and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robinson were
dispatched to Taiwan with the goal of persuading Chiang Kai-Shek to at least reduce the number
of Nationalist forces stationed on the offshore islands. Not only did Chiang refuse, but in July,
he moved an additional army division to Quemoy. Later, over the objections of the United States
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Military Assistance and Advisory Group, he increased the Nationalist presence on the island of
Quemoy to 85,000 military personnel.176

The Second Crisis: Preparing for Crisis and Confrontation

On August 23, 1958, the Chinese army commenced an artillery bombardment of Quemoy
Island, thus starting a second crisis in the Taiwan Straits region. Unlike the first crisis, this one
involved a US military that had fully implemented the pentomic military program. As a result,
considerations for nuclear warfare against China were at their most intense than in any previous
engagement in Asia.
As seen in the CIA’s analysis of the first Straits Crisis, the Eisenhower Administration
was very much aware that Chiang’s refusal to abandon the islands placed the initiative for any
future action toward the islands with the PRC. The US commitment to defend Taiwan and the
offshore islands meant that China could provoke an incident at any time of its choosing. This
situation forced the United States to factor the offshore islands into US policy planning. To
monitor the situation in the Taiwan straits, the USAF conducted a series of reconnaissance
flights both by Republic of China aircraft and US aircraft over the Chinese coast.
The first of these flights, using Nationalist pilots trained in the US, began in December,
1957. Four flights by Republic of China aircraft were flown, with the fourth shot down by
PLAAF fighter aircraft. The US itself flew two U-2 flights over eastern China, the last flight on
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June 18, 1958. These flights were looking for signs of Chinese preparations to invade the
offshore islands or Taiwan itself. No such preparations were seen during these flights.177 On
July 17, though, Mao Zedong made the decision to begin shelling Quemoy. Fighter units of the
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) were moved to the coast during the final weeks of
July. 178 At the same time, Republic of China and PLAAF aircraft engaged in a series of
dogfights over the straits area.179 On August 20, Mao committed to the straits operation, set to
begin on August 23.180
The movement of the fighter aircraft did not escape notice by the United States, most
likely detected by a U-2 mission flown on July 20. The State Department quickly suggested that
the US alleviate any worries the Nationalists might have over the PLAAF fighter deployment.
As far as the State Department was concerned, the deployment did not indicate the prelude to
major offensive action against the offshore islands.181 Chiang Kai-shek disagreed with the state
department assessment and insisted that the US had not realized the true danger of an imminent
PRC attack on the islands.182
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In spite of Chiang’s pleas for increased assistance and direct action by the United States,
the State Department never thought China would attack Taiwan, believing the Chinese realized
that such action would guarantee US involvement. As with the previous crisis, the State
Department identified that aggressive Nationalist actions would give the PRC a tremendous
propaganda advantage. The State Department also thought China might exert pressure on the
offshore islands while trying to avoid direct US action. Such an action would force the US to act
or the offshore islands would be placed in a situation as to “wither on the vine.”183
Dulles felt that it was time the US incorporated the islands into the defensive sphere
protected by the US military, reasoning that Chiang Kai-Shek had already integrated them into a
vital component of Taiwanese defense (by stationing a large contingent of troops). Eisenhower,
however, still recognized that the islands posed no military value, but only had worth in
preserving the morale of the Nationalists.184 The president was well aware that Chiang Kaishek’s deployment of 100,000 troops on the islands placed the United States in a difficult
position, essentially forcing US policy to become dependent on the actions of the PRC. The
president saw the situation as a “war of nerves,” and was cognizant that a potential for general
war existed. Inaction on the islands situation, Eisenhower felt, risked creating a condition
leading to war.185
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While refusing to commit US forces to defend the islands, the administration still took
several actions to mitigate the risks of potential PRC action in the Taiwan Straits. The US
dispatched air force units to Taiwan, and the US Air Force was in the midst of formulating a plan
to organize and deploy a composite air strike unit, comprised of both nuclear and conventional
tactical aircraft, to Taiwan.186 A near unanimous decision by the president’s cabinet approved
using nuclear weapons to prevent China from isolating or attacking the offshore islands. The
early plan called for 10-15 kiloton strikes on airfields in the coastal Amoy region (Xiamen). If
that did not force the Chinese to withdraw or halt their operations, then nuclear strikes against
the mainland would expand.187
Certain members of the State Department were very concerned about the JCS assessment
that nuclear strikes would be necessary to defend the islands. Dulles was contacted by Gerard C.
Smith, the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, suggesting the United States reexamine its commitment to the offshore islands if a non-nuclear method of defending the islands
could not be found. Smith suggested that Dulles convince the JCS to “urgently” consider nonnuclear, localized defense of the islands.188 Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter also
expressed concerns over JCS opinion that nuclear strikes used to repel any PRC attack could
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result in nuclear retaliation against Taiwan, Okinawa or elsewhere. Herter felt the PRC could be
convinced not to conduct any action against the offshore islands if the US issued a warning via
the Soviet Union.189
The State Department continued through the month of August to examine and prepare US
options for a confrontation with the PRC. It did not think Chiang Kai-shek could be convinced
to abandon the islands. Nor did the State Department believe evacuation was a good strategy.
The department feared that a Nationalist withdrawal from the islands would undermine the US
position in the Far East and force the Nationalists into attacking China, resulting in a devastating
counterattack by the PRC that could end in the loss of Taiwan. Additionally, the State
Department did not think a withdrawal would ease tensions, since the PRCs avowed goal was to
take Taiwan.190
The possibility that nuclear weapons could be used against China continued to haunt
State Department thinking. According to the JCS, the islands could be supplied without using
nuclear weapons, but only with difficulties. The military remained staunch in its assertion that
defending the islands required the use of nuclear weapons.191 The State Department still hoped
that warning the PRC might be enough, and requested that the US embassy in Poland ask for a
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renewal of the Warsaw talks as soon as possible.192 While the State Department worked for a
diplomatic solution, the military continued with its preparations. By mid-August, SAC ordered
five of its B-47 bombers, stationed on Guam, to prepare for nuclear attacks against mainland
China. Additionally, SAC alerted its units to prepare targeting Chinese cities, should the crisis
escalate to general war.193
On August 22, the State Department agreed to a number of actions the US could take (or
already had) to alleviate tensions in the straits. In addition to adding an aircraft carrier to the 7th
Fleet, the State Department agreed to have the 7th conduct naval exercises near the straits (but not
in the straits), have Admiral Felix Smoot visit the offshore islands, increase the number of
fighters on Taiwan and increase the flow of supplies to the offshore islands. Additionally, the
US would consider increasing the amount of military equipment on the offshore islands, and
increase shipping to Taiwan.194 These actions, designed to deter the Chinese and prevent a
repeat of the previous crisis, could not be implemented in time, as the Chinese army began
shelling Quemoy the next day.
The Second Crisis Begins

The military, already preparing for action in the straits, reacted quickly to the artillery
attack. The US Navy determined on August 24, that conventional forces would be sufficient in
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the short term for defending the island, but if an attack against the islands were to be stopped,
“effectively and quickly,” nuclear strikes against mainland China would be necessary.195 The air
force, on August 26, initiated the first phase of its contingency plan, created in the wake of the
first straits crisis. This three-phase plan would culminate in its final phase with expanded air
operations against China, conducted under the direction of SAC.196 On Taiwan, the USAF 868th
Tactical Missile Squadron, with its Matador missiles, and the US Army Nike-Hercules missile
batteries (air defense missiles capable of delivering conventional and nuclear warheads), both
already on 24-hour alert status since January, 1958, were notified to prepare for pending
action.197
On August 27, Chiang Kai-shek requested from Eisenhower that the American military
conduct strikes against mainland China in and around the Quemoy region, as well as provide
protection for supply convoys to Quemoy. More importantly, he asked the president to issue a
public statement pledging the United States to defend the offshore islands. But Chiang’s
requests did not stop there. He also suggested that Eisenhower change the command processes
between the US president and Pacific command by asking for the US Far East commander be
granted pre-delegated permissions to attack China without taking the time to receive orders from
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Washington.198 One week following Chiang Kai-shek’s requests for a public pledge to defend
the islands, the administration responded through US Taiwan Defense Command. The
administration affirmed US support for Taiwan, but twice reminded the Nationalist military that
per the December, 1954 agreement, the United States expected the Republic of China to consult
with the United States before taking any action against China.199
Choosing a correct response to the Chinese attack required an accurate assessment of
Chinese intentions behind the attack. The administration felt secure in its belief that China was
not planning an immediate invasion of the offshores. The US intelligence services and the State
Department both thought the latest attack was a means of testing US policy and not part of a
military operation against Taiwan. This assessment determined that neither China nor the Soviet
Union wanted to risk general war. More importantly, both the State Department and US
intelligence predicted China would continue to increase pressure on the offshore islands until the
US stepped in and guaranteed their safety.200 This assessment that the US must act or risk losing
Taiwan, was universally shared by the military, the intelligence services, the State Department
and the president.
Though the US military had already begun preparations for nuclear strikes before the first
Chinese shell landed on Quemoy, military commanders knew of Eisenhower’s insistence on
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controlling nuclear weapons. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke predicted that
Eisenhower would resist the JCS pressure to use nuclear weapons at the outset of the crisis. On
August 26, the president did just that and rejected the use of nuclear weapons for any early
military action and emphasized that any strikes against China, if necessary, would be with
conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons would remain in reserve, to be used as a last resort.201
Later, on August 29, the president reiterated his belief that the US should delay any use of
nuclear weapons.202
Dulles began to have second thoughts about US reliance on the pentomic military,
expressing his frustration with outside pressures, in the form of allied protests, interfering with
US capabilities to enforce policy. Clearly, if nuclear weapons were to be constrained by allied
opinion, then the basis of American policy and the usefulness of the pentomic military fell into
question. The military was unified across all three branches on the utility of nuclear weapons,
though Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor used Dulles frustration to point out that
military flexibility (dual capability) did not suffer from such restrictions. Dulles countered that
such flexibility did not matter when nuclear weapons were the only means of balance against
communist numerical superiority in Eurasia.203
Once again, the Eisenhower Administration was placed in the position of choosing
between the allied alliance and the military utility of nuclear weapons. For Eisenhower, Dulles
and the military, their belief in the utility of nuclear weapons remained unchanged from before.
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The president would not, however, sacrifice the support of American allies for the military gains
of defending the offshore islands. There was a limit to Eisenhower’s concessions to the allies,
though. If the offshores were seriously threatened, the president had decided to use tactical
nuclear weapons, regardless of the effect on the United States relations with its allies.
Eisenhower preferred to have the Nationalists defend the offshore islands rather than rely
on the United States. The administration, therefore, decided that the United States Navy would
help the Nationalists keep the islands supplied so that Nationalist troops could repulse any
invasion attempt. The administration focused its efforts on how the United States could ensure
supplies reached Quemoy without provoking a greater response from China. The answer was to
have US warships partially escort supply ships bound for Quemoy.204
The Chinese relieved the pressure on the islands by suspending their bombardment for
two days, beginning September 4. Coincidentally, on that same day, Dulles provided a statement
of American intent to protect Quemoy and Matsu, and though military preparations had been
made, the president was withholding action for the time being.205 Two days later, Chinese
Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issued a statement calling for the resumption of Sino-American
talks. Eisenhower interpreted this as an acceptance of the July 28 offer to resume the Warsaw
ambassadorial talks (a series of ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw, initiated in the wake of the
first crisis). The president responded publicly that he welcomed the Chinese acceptance.206 The
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Warsaw talks began on September 15 and essentially signaled the end of the crisis, though
shelling continued sporadically till the end of the year.207

The Second Crisis Assessment

Several historians have criticized the Eisenhower Administration for resorting to nuclear
weapons during the Taiwan Straits crises. H.W. Brands argues that Eisenhower let events in
Asia guide decision making, including nuclear policy, rather than taking the initiative and
deciding in advance a course of action, claiming that Eisenhower’s inaction was an attempt to let
crises resolve themselves. 208 Like a majority of historians, though, Brands addresses issues of
national security from the point of view of conflict with the Soviet Union and not looking at
nuclear policy as a means of exerting local control. As seen earlier, the Eisenhower
Administration had, in fact, tried very much to have a policy in place to address crises in the
Taiwan Straits region. In 1954, Eisenhower recognized the threat of crisis over the offshore
islands, but events overtook the administration’s planning. By 1958, however, the US military
had extensive policy plan in place and aimed at generating a strong, localized response to
Chinese attacks on the offshore islands. The key instrument to the administration’s response to
both crises was utilization of tactical nuclear weapons.
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Appu Soman is also critical of the Eisenhower Administration for its reliance on nuclear
weapons to defend the offshore islands. For Soman, Eisenhower placed the United States in a
position of either fighting a nuclear war or surrendering the offshore islands and shattering the
faith of US allies in the protective merits of the American “nuclear umbrella.” The
administration’s view of nuclear weapons, according to Soman, was merely an efficient means of
accomplishing a military goal and failed to recognize that the American public, along with US
allies, did not view nuclear war as an acceptable means of defending the islands, especially given
the low political value of the islands in world opinion.209 Craig, in a similar argument, cites
Eisenhower nuclear policy as eliminating the United States options for limited war, and linking
global war to even the smallest of crises. Contrary to Brands, however, Craig views
Eisenhower’s “wait and see” approach as a positive element in Eisenhower’s policies, and credits
that ambiguity as a key factor in allowing the United States to avoid war with China and the
Soviet Union.210
While Eisenhower did refrain from publicly threatening China with nuclear weapons,
behind the scenes, the United States military had significantly increased its nuclear preparations
to the point of near instantaneous deployment, hardly a casual “wait-and-see” approach,
suggesting that the administration preferred to act after Chinese action. The administration,
instead, acted before the crisis had even begun, rapidly activating tactical nuclear units in the
region to prepare for the worst possible scenario, a Chinese invasion of the offshore islands.
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Once the US was ready for the worst case scenario, the administration sought to achieve a
diplomatic resolution for the crisis.
A growing theory in nuclear policy history is the role of public opinion in constraining
US nuclear weapons utilization. T.V. Paul, for example, cites world opinion as the primary
restraint preventing the US from using nuclear weapons during Korea and the Taiwan Straits
Crisis.211 While this is an appropriate conclusion for why nuclear weapons were not used during
the Korean War, the evidence that the US did not use nuclear weapons during the Taiwan Straits
crises due to the restraining influences of the public and US allies remains scant. First, the
Taiwan Straits crises had little in common with the Korean War. Aside from the political value
of the islands, there was no military investment of troops as was the case during Korea. Second,
much of the administration believed that Chinese goals during both crises did not include the
invasion of Taiwan. And third, during both cases, the Eisenhower Administration tended to
dismiss the threat of Soviet intervention, so long as US actions did not threaten the national
security of the People’s Republic of China. In short, it could be reasonably argued that nuclear
weapons were not used because neither crisis exhibited the military or political intensity to
warrant their use against China, and not because public opinion had dictated they would not be
used.
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CHAPTER FOUR: KENNEDY AND THE END OF AN ERA
In January, 1961, John F. Kennedy took the office of president, a position held for eight
years by Eisenhower. The new president entered the decade intent on reforming both China and
nuclear policies. In the thirty-three months that he served as president, however, Kennedy would
change very little in either China policy or nuclear policy. Kennedy encountered many of the
same factors and variables that influenced both China and nuclear weapons policy under the
Truman and Eisenhower administrations, and, just like the preceding administrations, Kennedy
found himself turning to tactical nuclear weapons for containing China.
Many historians have adopted the viewpoint that the Kennedy Administration used
nuclear weapons policy in an attempt to control China’s strategic ambitions. Michael Schaller,
for example, argues Kennedy pursued the Limited Test Ban Treaty(LTBT) with the Soviet Union
in an effort to contain China’s nuclear ambitions, and therefore, contain China in Asia.212 Chang
also supports this theory, citing Kennedy’s motivations as an attempt to keep China, which he
viewed as an uncontrollable element, from possessing nuclear weapons and upsetting the
international order.213 While pursuit of the LTBT represented a strategic policy, what is often
overlooked by historians is the role of tactical nuclear weapons in Kennedy’s China policy. The
research in this chapter will demonstrate that tactical weapons, though not utilized as much as
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previous administrations, still served as an additional policy tool used by Kennedy to contain
China.
China Policy: The Kennedy Administration Assessment

The Kennedy Administration began its term sharing the same Chinese policy goals as the
Eisenhower administration, that of containment and disrupting the Sino-Soviet alliance. The
new administration even agreed that the best strategy for exploiting the Sino-Soviet divide was to
engage the Soviet Union with a constructive policy while adopting a confrontational policy
toward China. Changes in the international environment, however, combined with the
continuing threat of a new crisis with China, convinced the State Department and the JCS that it
was time to reassess American China policy. The findings of the reassessment determined that
Communist China did not want improved relations with the United States. For the most part, the
Kennedy Administration felt that Eisenhower’s China policy and American military force had
successfully contained China.214
In spite of this assessment, the Kennedy Administration still found the preceding
administration’s execution of policy to be lacking. Kennedy’s advisors felt that United States
did not possess the proper sense of urgency to forestall confrontations, that previous policy
reacted to events rather than working to avoid conflict.215 Eisenhower’s policy centered too
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much on preventing the collapse of the Nationalist government and did not possess clearlydefined, long-term goals for coping with a permanent Communist China.216 It was this flaw in
Eisenhower’s policy that the administration identified as the cause for US isolation from its allies
in regards to China.217
To address this deficiency in China policy, the administration would have to shift from
the policy goal of restoring the Nationalist government to a goal that accepted the long-lasting
existence of Communist China. Any belief that Communist China would collapse, either caused
externally by the Nationalists, or internally by elements dissatisfied with the Communist
revolution, was in the administration’s eyes, unfounded and unrealistic. Even in the unlikely
event of considerable disruption within China, it was expected that the Soviet Union would
intervene to prevent China from failing, no matter that there was a rift in relations between those
two nations.218
Accepting a permanent Communist China meant accepting the admission of the People’s
Republic of China into the United Nations. Kennedy’s advisors predicted Chinese admission to
the UN as inevitable and likely to happen within Kennedy’s first term, especially if China
became a nuclear power. It was believed that the international community would want to include
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China in the United Nations as a means of ensuring that nation’s compliance with international
nuclear arms control treaties.219
The rise of China as a nuclear armed power was one of three key issues Kennedy
identified that would have to be addressed in formulating a policy. The other two factors both
involved the United States relationship with its allies. The rate at which the nations surrounding
China were strengthening, Kennedy felt, was too slow to adequately contain China. Finally, the
United States’ methods of containing China were harming the relationships between the US and
its allies.220
During previous administrations, containing China required only a small allocation of
resources. As China’s influence grew, however, more effort from the US would be required to
maintain the status quo. China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would further hamper this
effort. China’s first successful atomic test was expected to be a “watershed” event, comparable
in magnitude to the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test. Additionally, the administration predicted
China would become more aggressive, in part, because it was thought Mao needed an external
threat to maintain the Communist revolution, and partly because of the ideological differences
between China and the United States.221
The issue of recognizing China in the United Nations and the aggressive confrontations
between the United States and China alarmed US allies. The offshore islands served as a major
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point of contention between the United States and the international community. US allies feared
what they called the “unpredictable risks” found within the US policy of supporting Chiang at
the risk of war with Mao, and, possibly, the Soviet Union. The longer the US maintained its
current offshores policy, the harder the United States would find to disengage from that policy.
The challenge facing the Kennedy Administration was convincing its allies to support the
American position on China. Without that support, the US could not pursue a long-term strategy
of containing China.222
The Kennedy Administration thought US defense of the offshores was part of a
misguided policy protecting the wrong nations from China. While Eisenhower policy focused on
Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, Kennedy considered those nations as weaknesses for the US.
Maintaining these nations as allies against China required “massive US aid”. The administration
feared that continued growth of Chinese power would lead to these nations becoming more
accommodating toward China, especially if those nations felt the United States had lost the
political will or military ability to protect them.223
The administration’s assessment singled out the rift between the Soviet Union and China
as having potential for advancing US China policy. It was believed that the Soviet Union would
fear a strong China, therefore, as China strengthened, the Sino-Soviet rift would intensify and the
Soviet Union would become more amenable to cooperation with the United States.224 The call
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for a more flexible China policy allowed the US to exploit any opportunity that presented itself
to act on this fear and approach the Soviet Union about a joint policy toward China.225
China Policy: The Administration’s Recommendations

On considering China policy, the Kennedy Administration explored three options very
similar to the options the Eisenhower Administration explored in 1953. The actions considered
ranged from full military enforcement to contain China to reducing the US strategic presence in
the Pacific region. The moderate option called for long term containment by strengthening
Japan, India, Taiwan and Korea to act as balancing powers in Asia.226
The administration quickly rejected direct confrontation for several reasons, many of
which are the same reasons the Eisenhower Administration ruled out direct military
confrontation. Military encirclement required a staggering financial investment and drained the
US military of valuable, and limited, resources. The political price was deemed to be even more
costly. The European allies would refuse to participate in such a policy and the Asian-Pacific
nations could be driven by US actions to embrace China. Kennedy’s advisors felt encircling
China with the US military would encourage China to adopt a more confrontational stance
toward the US. Whatever gains were to be had through direct confrontation would be temporary,
at best.227
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Reversing current policy and improving relations between the two countries was
considered and just as quickly rejected. The administration thought that accommodation with
China granted the United States more flexibility to exploit the Sino-Soviet Rift. By adopting a
more accommodating policy, however, it was felt the international community would view the
United States as leading from a position of weakness. This appearance of weakness, as believed
by the administration, would encourage China to expand its influence.228 This reasoning is
identical to that of the Eisenhower Administration, when it too, thought that failure to act
aggressively would invite China to expand its influence.
The remaining option left for the United States followed a middle road between
accommodation and direct conflict and became the preferred course of action. Executing that
policy involved disengaging from what was seen as “unproductive aspects” of current US policy
but still providing clear proof of US determination to resist the expansion of Communist
China.229 Additionally, this option would have to follow a narrow range of actions to avoid
easing pressure on China, while not applying too much pressure and drawing the Soviet Union
and China closer together.230
The administration’s recommendations on strengthening the US position in the Pacific
encompassed more aid for military, political and counter-subversive activities. While all
American allies were to be included, particular focus in the form of long-term aid would be
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directed toward Japan and India. The United States would also explore methods of using Asian
nationalism to US advantage. Finally, the United States would seek a means of placing
responsibility for continued conflict on the People’s Republic of China. 231
China Policy: Taiwan

Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist government on Taiwan proved to be extremely
problematic for Kennedy. Taiwan was a “wasting asset” as far as the administration was
concerned. Kennedy’s advisors predicted that the Nationalists on Taiwan would only weaken
over time while Communist China would strengthen. This would occur regardless of any action
the US took to prevent it. The United States would have to prepare itself for the possibility of
the complete collapse of Taiwan, including its loss to China 232
Much like the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy Administration recognized the
United States had a formal obligation toward Taiwan, an obligation from which it could not
disengage without a significant loss of international prestige amongst the international
community, especially its Asian allies. Kennedy also recognized that if the Republic of China
fell to the People’s Republic of China, the United States would again suffer a crippling blow to
its international prestige and future efforts to contain international communism. This risk led
Kennedy to continue United States protection of the Nationalists on Taiwan, even though Taiwan
no longer carried the same value for the United States as before. The price of losing Taiwan far
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outweighed any negative consequences from defending Taiwan. The administration even
considered a localized war worth the cost if it could frustrate China’s efforts to take Taiwan.233
Continued support for Taiwan meant the administration would have to mitigate one of the
most damaging elements of defending the Nationalists. Chiang would have to be convinced to
evacuate the offshore islands. Kennedy would provide incentive for Chiang to abandon the
islands by continuing military aid through the Military Assistance Program and by increasing US
presence in Far East. It was felt that modern missiles deployed on Taiwan, but under US
military control, might also help to convince Chiang to abandon the islands. Other incentives
included an economic plan, underwritten by the US, for Taiwan and convincing other Asian
allies (Japan, India) to provide support to Taiwan.234
Historians have uncovered a range of reasons for why Kennedy chose to confront China,
rather than the Soviet Union, regardless of the considerable evidence that such a choice could
only lead to complications for the United States. According to Gordon Chang, Kennedy’s
decision was based on the president’s perception that China represented the greater threat to
American interests, particularly in Asia. Chinese behavior was confrontational and
unpredictable, whereas Soviet behavior was more docile and thus more compatible with US
goals.235
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For Cohen, the decision to confront China rather than the Soviet Union was based on the
combination of the dynamic of the Sino-Soviet split and domestic issues. That a rift had
developed between China and the Soviet Union meant that United States accommodating one
side, would, through the existence of the split, harm the other. By 1960, the Soviet Union
represented the only nation that possessed the military power to threaten the United States.
Therefore, Cohen argues, Kennedy felt the United States was better served seeking
accommodation with the Soviet Union. Cohen also points out that Kennedy faced domestic
pressures from the China lobby and from anti-communist proponents. Confronting China
allowed Kennedy to appear strong against communism yet still seek accommodation with the
Soviet Union. By the same logic, maintaining a firm policy against China allowed Kennedy to
silence criticism from those who supported Chiang and the Nationalist government.236
Schaller credits Kennedy’s perception of China as an unpredictable element threatening
the international order as a guiding factor in choosing a policy of confrontation. Domestic
issues, too, also influenced Kennedy’s decision, in a more indirect mode. The vocal China
Lobby, according to Schaller, tended to silence advocates for changing China policy, thereby
reducing or eliminating any alternative, more peaceable, actions from being forwarded to the
president.237
While all of the above reasons are credible and supported, there is a common element that
exists across three separate presidential administrations over thirteen years, that of US prestige in
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the international order. A common perception held by Kennedy and shared by his two
predecessors identified unacceptable damage to the image of the United States should China gain
Taiwan. This fear that the loss of Taiwan would cripple the United States ability to project itself
into international stage served as a driving force for confronting China.
JFK and Tactical Nuclear Policy

The administration entered its first year believing the United States defense policy was
dangerously unbalanced in favor of nuclear doctrine. Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, Robert
McNamara, thought that Eisenhower policy had been plagued by civilian advisors who placed
too much emphasis on strategic force and first strike/counterforce planning while ignoring the
role of deterrent force and second strike force capability. Unlike the Eisenhower Administration,
McNamara felt that tactical nuclear policy inhibited American warfighting capability and posed
dangerous risks to the country.238
McNamara believed the use of tactical nuclear weapons would confuse the enemy and
alienate US allies.239 The utilization of tactical nuclear weapons would certainly lead to
escalation in any scenario in which they were employed. Tactical weapons, in McNamara’s

Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, (Bundy) to President
Kennedy, FRUS, 1961-1963, National Security Policy, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, ed. David W.
Malbon (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), 18-19.
239
National Intelligence Estimate NIE 1-61 Estimate of the World Situation, January 17, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963
Vol VIII National Security Policy, 3-10.
238

92

opinion, lacked military utility, and the United States was better served by changing the focus of
US military policy from the pentomic military to non-nuclear operations.240
Kennedy, however, disagreed, believing that tactical nuclear weapons still retained
military utility. The president’s counterproposal was to retain the tactical nuclear capability of
the US military and strengthen its non-nuclear components.241 The United States would pursue
the dual capability the US Army sought after losing its budget battles over the pentomic military
during Eisenhower’s administration. Strengthening the non-nuclear capability of the US
military, however, did not stop the continued growth of the pentomic arm of the military. Under
Kennedy, tactical nuclear weapons production, which had risen considerably under Eisenhower,
continued to rise and peaked under the Kennedy Administration. Nuclear weapons testing and
development also continued under Kennedy, culminating in 1962, the year with the most
American nuclear tests than in any other year before or since.242
The president had concerns, though, over defining the threshold for using nuclear
weapons and found the lack of guidance on establishing that criteria frustrating.243 Kennedy
believed the best policy rested with America’s allies, especially NATO. The problem, he
thought, was that many US allies had not modernized their military policies to include tactical
nuclear weapons. Kennedy’s answer to correct that shortcoming involved the United States
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providing tactical nuclear training to its allies.244 As seen in his proposals, Kennedy clearly
identified a distinction between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. Going
against the advice of his defense secretary, Kennedy continued with Eisenhower’s military
policy, modifying it only by strengthening some of the non-nuclear capabilities while increasing
tactical nuclear ability. The continued presence of the pentomic military combined with the
administration’s decision to continue confrontation with China ensured that any future crisis
would, once again, involve nuclear weapons.

The Offshore Islands
The possibility of a third Taiwan Straits Crisis occupied Kennedy’s staff early in the
administration. By April, 1961, the State Department and the NSC warned that the offshore
islands issue remained unresolved, and that the “fighting season” was approaching.245 The
administration identified a requirement to develop contingency plans in case another straits crisis
developed, noting that the president would need to determine which specific elements of the
military would be utilized, as well as directing the diplomatic effort. 246
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The Offshore islands contained a twofold danger in that the US could be dragged into the
Chinese civil war and that China would continually use the islands against the US. The
commitment to defending the islands would only become harder over time, particularly since it
would be extremely difficult to protect the islands without nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear
weapons, however, contained politically disastrous repercussions in the form of strenuous
objections from America’s allies. Kennedy, however, just as Eisenhower, could not separate
nuclear weapons from the defense of the offshores since the administration felt that it was the
ambiguous threat of nuclear retaliation, combined with the Soviet reluctance to defend China
over the offshores, which served as a successful deterrent preventing the Chinese from taking the
islands.247
Abandoning the islands could not be considered, since the offshore islands were
recognized both by the US and China as a critical element of Nationalist morale. Yet, the next
crisis, which the administration was convinced would happen, would be very difficult to obtain
allied support for the US position. In order to gain more international support for Taiwan, the
United States would have to disengage from its obligation to defend the offshore islands.248
Disengagement from the offshore islands proved to be very difficult given that neither
Communist China nor Nationalist China could see any benefit in easing pressure on the islands.
The disposition of the islands contained too much political value for both sides to allow either
one to back down. Maintaining pressure on the islands served both the Nationalists and
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Communist China by continuing the civil war. For the People’s Republic of China, the offshores
were tied to Taiwan and considered an internal affair. Additionally, the offshores islands served
Mao Zedong, through their occupation by Chiang Kai-Shek, as a convenient means of
antagonizing the United States. 249
For the US to abandon the Offshores, Chiang would have to abandon the islands as soon
as possible, and withdraw voluntarily. To abandon the islands under duress of a crisis would
make the US appear weak.250 Chiang, however, would not abandon the islands. A policy
procedure for convincing Chiang to abandon the islands was devised where the US would assure
Chiang that the defensive agreements between the US and Taiwan remained, but encourage him
to refrain from conducting offensive actions against the mainland from the islands.251 New
assurances of commitment would also be offered, hinting that Chiang should evacuate the
islands. Should Chiang not evacuate the islands, the US would inform Taiwan that it would not
participate in defending the offshore islands.252
The administration also developed an alternative diplomatic plan for dealing with the
offshores. In the event of a new crisis, the issue would be brought before the United Nations and
the United States would tie the fate of the islands to other issues with China. The feeling within
the administration was that if the islands could be addressed in the United Nations, it could
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prevent a future crisis. Utilizing the United Nations, though, contained some risk for the United
States. A UN resolution could call for evacuation of the islands; which Chiang would defy. Nor
could cooperation from Communist China be counted on, as it would certainly be defiant of any
attempt to interfere with the status of the offshore islands.253
The Kennedy Administration interpreted previous US policy during the Straits crisis as
largely successful, identifying US military action as partially restraining Communist China
during the 1954-1955 Crisis. During the 1958 crisis the administration felt that US military
action had completely restrained Chinese aggression against the offshores.254 In a future crisis,
the administration believed China would escalate it to a level more intense than that of any
previous crisis. The increased risk to Taiwan placed an emphasis on the ability of Taiwan to
defend itself, particularly the Taiwanese air force. The condition of the Taiwanese air force
worried the administration since it felt that the current planning failed to account for any attrition
of Taiwanese air force by the PLAAF during a crisis, thereby leaving Taiwan open to attack.255
The fear that a new crisis would leave Taiwan extremely vulnerable called for a new
contingency plan. This new plan would inform American allies of US determination to protect
Taiwan and the offshore islands and publically reiterate the Dulles-Chiang statement from 1958
to seek political resolution over military resolution. Parts of the Warsaw negotiations would be
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published to demonstrate US commitment to a peaceful process to resolution.256 Finally, the
issue would be brought before the UN and the US would condemn the attacks before the UN
General Assembly, as well as consider forming a working group with the UN to resolve the
issue.257
In summer, 1962, a Chinese troop movement along the coast caused alarm within some
departments of the administration. The intelligence community interpreted the movement as a
prelude to another attack on the offshore islands, possibly in an effort pre-empt a Nationalist
attack on the mainland. It was believed China hoped to gain prestige amongst neutral Asian
nations by instigating a new crisis. Such action by China would provide a benefit by motivating
an increase in domestic production and by testing the relationship between the United States and
Taiwan.258 The State Department assessment differed from the intelligence community’s in that
they did not believe the troop movement represented any offensive action by China, but felt the
movement was for defense against any Nationalist attack on the mainland.259
The international situation also seemed to present an opportune time for China to attack
the offshore islands. The United States had recently suffered the embarrassment of the failed
Cuban invasion. The situation in Vietnam had also improved for China, with the US

256

Contingency Planning for Possible Renewed Chinese Communist Attack on the Offshore Islands, July 4, 1961, 6.
Box 22, Countries, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
257
Ibid., 7-9.
258
Research Memorandum SSG-2, June 22, 1962, to W. Averell Harriman, from Roger Hilsman, subject: Chinese
Communist Motivations in a Possible Offshore Islands Probe, 1-4. Box 23, Countries, National Security Files, John
F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
259
Memorandum from Roger Hilsman to Governor Harriman, June 22, 1962, Subject: Evidence of Peiping’s
Concern over Possible GRC-US Intentions, 1-3. Box 23, Countries, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library.

98

increasingly getting involved, and in the summer of 1962, the Viet Cong remained a strong
military opponent. And there was the continued lack of support for US offshores policy from
American allies. The timing and the perceived benefits gained by China led the administration to
assume that Chinese activity was the prelude to an imminent attack, but not an actual invasion of
the offshore islands.260
An offshores working group was formed to explore US options to deal with the pending
crisis. The scenarios explored ranged from a Chinese buildup on the mainland to a substantial
military effort against the offshore islands, including amphibious operations. The scope of
responses varied depending on the degree of Chinese action. Most recommendations provided
material support for Taiwan, but placed the responsibility for direct military response on the
Nationalists. Direct military action by the United States would be initiated only if China began
amphibious operations against the offshore islands. This action would include non-nuclear
strikes against the Chinese mainland. If Chinese action included an invasion of Taiwan or the
Penghus islands, then the US would honor its treaty obligations with Taiwan. The working
group advised that the president refrain from deciding on US policy until further action was
taken by China.261
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A policy that depended largely on the Nationalist ability to defend itself concerned both
Kennedy and McNamara. Kennedy had asked specifically about comparisons of the Taiwanese
air force against the PLAAF.262 McNamara expressed his concern over the vulnerability of the
offshore islands, and asked under what conditions nuclear weapons would be required to defend
the islands. The JCS felt nuclear weapons were not necessary as long as China did not make a
determined effort to take the islands.263
Soviet reaction to American policy was factored into consideration. The risk in
American offshores policy lay in that a new crisis in the Taiwan Straits would pressure the
Soviets to do or say something in an effort to avoid appearing weakened as the world’s
communist leader. American assessments of the Soviets determined they would not support
China taking either Taiwan or the offshore islands. In a crisis, the administration believed Soviet
reaction would likely take the form of verbal support for China while seeking a means of
averting conflict between the US and China. The Soviets would also advise China to ease
tensions, in order to avoid Soviet involvement in a straits crisis, especially if a US nuclear strike
were imminent or a US-supported landing by Nationalists on the Chinese mainland. It was
believed the Soviets would privately inform the Chinese that they could not count on Soviet
support if hostilities erupted between the US and China.264
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The working group also explored the range of actions available to the US that would not
trigger Soviet interference. The group’s findings determined that the United States could safely
perform several operations without Soviet reaction. Among these actions included US Naval
operations against the PLAAF and Chinese Navy within a three-mile limit of the mainland.
Retaliatory bombardment and pursuit of PLAAF aircraft and retaliation against mainland targets
near the straits were also deemed safe actions. Soviet restraint was contingent, though, on
whether the US action was meant to avoid a major defeat, and US action excluded the possibility
of nuclear strikes. If those contingencies were violated, then Soviet interference, up to and
including direct involvement of the Soviet Air Force, was expected.265 American ambassador to
the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman met with Soviet ambassador Anatolly F. Dobrynin to
sound out the Soviet position on the offshores situation. The meeting, however, ended
inconclusively as Dobrynin deflected from the issue.266
On June 27, 1962, Kennedy enacted one of the recommendations from the offshores
working group by publicly stating he agreed with Eisenhower’s stance on the Taiwan Straits, as
well as referencing his own remarks supporting the defense of the offshores made in October,
1960. He also tied the status of the islands to the fate of Taiwan and peace in the region. In
keeping with the findings of the 1961 study, Kennedy kept his statement vague as to any specific
actions the US would take, instead emphasizing the defensive posture of US military forces in
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the region.267 The fears of the administration were never realized since Mao did not attack the
offshore islands. The lack of a crisis meant that nuclear planning did not possess the intensity or
activity of the two crises during the Eisenhower Administration. A different crisis with China,
though, would bring tactical nuclear weapons to the forefront of policy options.
Nuclear Policy: The Chinese Nuclear Program

Under Eisenhower, the threat of nuclear armed China was a distant possibility, and then
only with a large amount of aid from the Soviet Union. The Kennedy Administration faced an
entirely different situation, with a China capable of independently developing its own nuclear
weapons. A nuclear-armed China did not threaten US national security, nor was it thought China
would engage in a nuclear first strike scenario. The impact Chinese nuclear weapons would have
on the Taiwan Straits situation was considered minimal as the administration did not think the
Chinese could use its nuclear reputation to obtain the offshore islands.268
Kennedy was more concerned about the effects of a nuclear-armed China on its
neighboring countries in Asia. Utilizing its nuclear strike capability, China could apply pressure
to keep the United States from providing aide to Asian nations. China could use nuclear
weapons to force the acknowledgement by the rest of the world of China’s status as a world
power. A nuclear-armed China could impose nuclear blackmail against its neighboring countries
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while demonstrating that US nuclear power was the true danger in Asia. Asian nations, fearing
two contentious nuclear powers in their midst, could seek a nuclear-free Asia. China’s
neighboring countries might add their support for admitting Communist China to the United
Nations. Chinese nuclear capability, by the implied threat of nuclear retaliation, raised the
threshold for American nuclear use, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the US nuclear force.
Chinese nuclear weapons would place a strategic burden on Asian nations, leading to more
dependence on the United States, including a requirement for nuclear cooperation with the US,
and an increased dependence on conventional military assistance.269 It was believed that fear of
the Chinese nuclear program had led Taiwan to request nuclear weapons from the United
States.270 The US reliance on tactical nuclear weapons could cause Asian nations to fear asking
the US for help in a crisis, wary of a nuclear response to a scenario involving low levels of
Chinese aggression. Additionally, the more reliant the United States on tactical nuclear
weapons, the more likely China and other Asian nations would insist on a nuclear free Asia.271
To forestall China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and avoid the substantial and
detrimental effects that would occur to American policy, the administration explored several
options to deal with the Chinese nuclear weapons program. Diplomatic efforts would focus on
bringing China into the fold regarding nuclear test ban treaties and international norms for
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strategic weapons. These diplomatic efforts, however, were entirely dependent on China’s
willingness to participate. Additionally, even if China complied with a nuclear test ban treaty
after it its first successful nuclear test, it would not mitigate the damage suffered to the
effectiveness of US nuclear forces.
Aggressive, military options were then explored as a means of delaying the development
of a Chinese nuclear weapon. The JCS considered several covert actions to hamper or destroy
the Chinese nuclear program.272 These actions ranged from using Nationalist commandos to
attack the Chinese nuclear research facilities to employing a tactical nuclear weapon, either by
US forces or Soviet forces. The JCS predicted that using tactical nuclear weapons would lead to
escalation and retaliation, as well as “strong criticism” from the international community. Nor
was Soviet cooperation for such an effort expected.273
In spite of the anticipated negative reactions to direct military action against the Chinese
nuclear weapons program, the administration still attempted to engage the Soviet Union in
stopping the Chinese nuclear program. In January, 1963, Ambassador Averell Harriman spoke
with a Soviet representative about the Chinese program, both were in apparent agreement that
the Chinese nuclear capability must be dealt with, either through a Test Ban Treaty or by threats
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of “taking out” China’s nuclear facilities.274 Later that year, McGeorge Bundy met with Soviet
ambassador to the US, Anatoly Debrymin, and attempted to get consensus on the Chinese
program. Debrymin, however, tied the issue to NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe, and used the
meeting to object to the existence of the NATO multi-lateral force.275
More conciliatory action was also explored, and these included moving American nuclear
weapons away from China and increasing defensive, non-nuclear military forces in the region. It
was also recommended that the United States avoid the creation of a specific nuclear
counterforce targeting Chinese nuclear capability, deploying medium ranged, ballistic missiles in
Asia, or altering the US nuclear posture in Asia.276 The last recommendation would have
marked a reversal in a trend in new nuclear deployments started by the Kennedy Administration
in 1961, when the air force deployed new Mace tactical nuclear weapons systems in Okinawa as
part of a modernization of nuclear weapons systems in Asia.277

274

W. Averell Harriman account of meeting with JFK, June 23, 1963, p 3. George Washington University, National
Security Agency archives (online), accessed April 18, 2016, https://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/seaborgdiary-21-june-1963.pdf
275
Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Debrymin, May 17, 1963. Box 410, Robert W. Komer,
National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
276
A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability: Major Conclusions and Key Issues, October
15, 1963, 6, George Washington University, National Security Agency archives (online), accessed April 18, 2016,
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb488/ .
277
Mindling and Bolton, 233.

105

Nuclear Policy: China and India

After the failure to secure Soviet cooperation to destroy the Chinese nuclear weapons
program, Kennedy still looked upon tactical nuclear weapons as a means of containing China
and maintaining the United States’ defense commitments to its Asian allies. During the height of
the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, India and China engaged in a brief one-month conflict in
which the Indian military was routed, and China gained free reign over the Himalayan region
near the Chinese-Indian-Tibetan border, seizing the Aksai-Chin region of India. The
administration was concerned that China might attack India, a major American ally, a second
time. The poor performance of the Indian military during the first conflict left the administration
doubting India could resist a determined attack from China. In May, 1963, the NSC discussed
how the administration would respond should China attack India again. McNamara was explicit
in his belief that not only were nuclear weapons required to defend India, but that nuclear
weapons were preferred over non-nuclear options when defending India, particularly over
sending US troops into the Himalayan region. Kennedy, while not expressing agreement or
disagreement with McNamara, stated that the United States could not allow India to suffer
another defeat at the hands of the Chinese.278
Control of the White House may have changed hands and parties, but American policy
toward China remained relatively unchanged. The reasons can be traced to the controlling
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variables rather than the personalities determining policy. Containment policy, the American
commitment to defend Taiwan, the belief that the Soviet Union would not interfere, Chinese
hostility toward the US, the all-important perception of the role of prestige in international affairs
and domestic anti-communism all combined to drive Kennedy to continue the United States’
policy of confronting Communist China.
Continuing the policy of confrontation meant facing the same issues as before. Much
like the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy Administration found itself mired in the
offshores islands, the result of Chiang’s refusal to abandon the islands, the formal agreement to
defend Taiwan and the risk to American prestige amongst the Asian nations and American allies
should the offshore islands, or Taiwan, fall to China. The administration may have constructed a
contingency plan to disengage from the offshores, but the political costs of losing the offshores,
much less Taiwan, were deemed too high. Kennedy’s public statements in the summer of 1962
left no doubt that the United States associated the offshore islands with the political status of
Taiwan.
Though Kennedy never faced a situation like the Korean War, or a Taiwan Straits crisis
in confronting China, he still utilized tactical nuclear weapons in considering his military
options. The administration’s considerations were inconsistent and belied the initial push by the
administration to limit US dependence on tactical nuclear weapons. When the administration did
perceive a threat to the offshore islands, tactical nuclear weapons played a much more reduced
role than they did during the previous two crises. In 1958, the movement of PLAAF fighters
sparked an aggressive response in nuclear preparations by the US military. In 1962, however,
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the movement of PLA troops brought no direct military preparations, though such action was
discussed.
Throughout 1962, and into early 1963, the administration considered a pre-emptive act of
war using tactical nuclear weapons in an effort to deprive the Chinese of their own nuclear
weapons. This marked a significant departure from the nuclear planning of Eisenhower and
Truman. Given the considerable damage to American Asian policy should the Chinese gain
nuclear weapons, it becomes understandable why Kennedy would consider some of the more
extreme measures. Failing that, the administration pursued the Limited Test Ban Treaty in an
attempt to bring international pressure against China to stop development of nuclear weapons.
Cooperating with the Soviet Union on the LTBT also played into the American policy of
exploiting the rift in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Yet China remained independent of the Soviet
Union on nuclear weapons issues, and Kennedy knew this. The harsh reality for Kennedy was
that the only way to stop the Chinese from obtaining nuclear weapons was to use military
force.279 Like the presidents before him, Kennedy was not willing to risk the international
consequences of unilateral action with nuclear weapons, and refrained from using them against
the Chinese nuclear weapons program.
While McNamara may have intended to significantly alter US reliance on tactical nuclear
weapons, in the end, the Kennedy Administration continued the policy of the Eisenhower
Administration. Gaddis has argued that Kennedy relied less on nuclear weapons for crisis
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management though he was much more willing to use them when compared to Eisenhower.
Kennedy tended to focus on how to conduct war rather than focus on war avoidance, as was the
case during the Eisenhower Administration.280
In choosing to confront China, the Kennedy Administration had to consider all options
for all possible contingencies. Tactical nuclear weapons were the one component of Kennedy
policy that allowed the United States to maintain its commitment to defend Taiwan and the
offshore islands in the face of direct Chinese attack, though this was not apparent to the
administration in 1961. In creating the first contingency plan for defending the islands,
McNamara focused on non-nuclear responses should China attempt to force the offshores issue.
By 1962, though, McNamara was inquiring at what point the US would be required to utilize
nuclear weapons to defend the islands. The answer was only if China made a determined effort
to take the islands. Tactical nuclear weapons allowed the US to cover this scenario and thus
allow the United States to guarantee its commitment to Taiwan.
McNamara may not have wholly changed his position in 1962 when he inquired about
the necessity of using nuclear weapons to defend the offshore islands, but, by May, 1963, he had
had reversed his position and embraced the use of nuclear weapons as a means of response to
China. In considering US reactions to a Chinese attack on India, McNamara turned first to using
tactical nuclear weapons, rather than use a non-nuclear force. Once again, tactical nuclear
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weapons provided the only practical military means of defending India from a determined attack
by China.
The Chinese nuclear weapons program may not have been a threat to US national
security, but it did, in a number of ways, upset the strategic balance in Asia. The Asian reaction
to a nuclear-armed China, calling for a nuclear free Asia, would have deprived the United States
of its greatest military advantage in confronting China, tactical nuclear weapons. Other
consequences included an expensive increase in reliance on non-nuclear forces, American allies
could ask for its own nuclear weapons, adding further to the danger of escalating any future
crisis. Even worse for the United States, Asian nations could become more accommodating to
China, and less accommodating to the United States. A nuclear-armed China would certainly be
admitted to the United Nations, on its own terms. These political and military costs elevated
stopping the Chinese nuclear program to a high priority in the Kennedy Administration.
The Kennedy Administration struggled to find a means to stop the Chinese nuclear
program. Using tactical nuclear weapons provided the best assurance of delaying the program,
but no action, no matter the size or scope, would prevent China from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The administration clearly recognized the political liability of using nuclear weapons in an
unprovoked act of war on China. By having the Soviets destroy Chinese nuclear research
facilities, or at least cooperate in such an operation, Kennedy could avoid the political cost of
nuclear use, yet still obtain the benefits of delaying the Chinese program. When the Soviets
refused to cooperate, the administration still considered, though ultimately rejected, the option of
using American nuclear weapons against the Chinese nuclear weapons program.
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CONCLUSION
In the years between June 1950 and May 1963, the United States repeatedly considered
the option of utilizing nuclear weapons against Communist China. For the majority of these
years, tactical nuclear weapons were the prevalent choice for exercising American military
strength on the Asian continent. There were two dominating factors that steered American
military policy toward considering the use of nuclear weapons against China. First, the
perception that China had to be confronted aggressively in order to preserve American prestige
as a world power, and use that prestige to prevent the expansion of communism in Asia. Second,
the belief that only tactical nuclear weapons would allow the United States military to
successfully restrain China on the Asian continent in the event of conflict.
Many historians recognize the importance of prestige in American policy, but link it to
strategic nuclear policy, arguing that all nuclear weapons were used in the context of deterrence
policies designed to prevent a China from conducting actions against US interests. Thomas
Christensen, for example, argues that by incorporating nuclear weapons into a deterrence policy
overemphasized the importance of the role of prestige, forcing the US to adopt an aggressive
nuclear stance, lest deterrence be undermined.281 The use of tactical nuclear weapons fits cleanly
into coercive diplomacy model put forth by Abram Shulsky, which identifies the need for using
the display or threat of excessive force to obtain concessions from an opposing government.282
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It is clear from the research that there was a shared belief amongst the three
administrations addressed in this study that prestige and the appearance of weakness, mainly by
inaction or accommodation, would encourage Chinese aggression against American interests in
Asia. This belief led Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy to pursue policies intended to show
American strength and confront China in an effort to prevent future conflict, essentially a policy
of deterrence. Once it had been determined that the United States had to adopt an aggressive
stance toward China, the military component of US policy assumed a greater role than economic
or diplomatic efforts. With an increased role in China policy, the presidents and the military
relied on the most efficient weapons system in the US arsenal, tactical nuclear weapons.
Prestige as a variable of policy played different roles at different times. Under Truman,
the lack of tactical capability threatened the deterrent value of the American nuclear stockpile.
The inability to successfully execute tactical nuclear warfare in Korea was perceived to be
damaging to the reputation of the American ability to retaliate. This risk of damaging US
prestige served as a restraining influence against United States’ nuclear policy in Korea.283
When tactical nuclear weapons became abundant in numbers and capability, the role of prestige
reversed. Eisenhower and Kennedy changed from restraining nuclear policy out of fear of
damaging the United States’ nuclear reputation, to that of employing nuclear aggression as the
only means of obtaining American military goals and thus protecting the reputation of the United
States as a reliable ally.
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The viewpoint of most historians does not take into account a separate role for tactical
nuclear weapons, yet two of the three presidents in this study clearly identified a distinct and
separate role for tactical nuclear weapons within American China Policy. Tactical nuclear
weapons allowed the United States to employee the utility of nuclear weapons within a limited
war scenario without incurring the risk of general war. The application of the doctrine of tactical
nuclear warfare manifested itself in American China policy during the post-Korean War planning
and the Taiwan Straits crises, when the United States relied exclusively on tactical weapons to
ensure military objectives. The Truman Administration is unique in that the technology of
tactical nuclear weapons had not advanced enough to allow them to be considered to use in
American policy. Nevertheless, Truman still sought to use nuclear weapons, first by using
strategic weapons as tactical weapons, then by using nuclear weapons in a bluff maneuver for
coercive diplomacy to force China to the bargaining table during the Korean War.
The alternatives to reliance on tactical nuclear weapons contained too high a political cost
for the United States. Disengaging from the defense of South Korea or the offshore islands
damaged the perception of the United States as an ally and questioned the American commitment
to its Asian allies. Conventional military operations risked unacceptably large numbers of
American casualties over a lengthy conflict and the domestic backlash such a military endeavor
would entail. Using strategic nuclear weapons contained the high risk of escalating a limited war
to general war with the Soviet Union. Without tactical nuclear weapons, American policy could
not incorporate the defense of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan or the offshore islands into the
American sphere of influence in the Pacific.
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The dynamic of the US policy hinging on China as a non-nuclear power ended on three
o’clock in the afternoon, on October 16, 1964, when China detonated its first atomic bomb.284
Kennedy’s fears that China would be immediately admitted to the United Nations were
unfounded, as it took another seven years before the People’s Republic of China would displace
the Republic of China as a member.285 The belief that the international community could
somehow control China’s nuclear ambitions was also unfounded, as China has not fully
participated in most major nuclear non-proliferation treaties and even assisted Pakistan in
obtaining nuclear weapons. In a policy similar to American efforts to deprive China of nuclear
weapons, China has participated in diplomatic efforts to keep North Korea from obtaining
nuclear weapons.286
After the Kennedy Administration, tactical nuclear weapons as a method of policy
against China declined in consideration. During the administration of Richard Nixon, the
president considered the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam, but only in the context of
coercive diplomacy aimed at North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Similar to Truman’s
Operation Hudson Harbor, Nixon’s threat was a bluff that produced unintended results. China,
which was not the target of the threats, still reacted by placing its military on alert. 287
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Tactical weapons themselves ceased to be a part of the active US inventory after 1992,
when President George H.W. Bush ordered the tactical stockpile withdrawn from service.288 The
reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in China policy continues to this day. Current military
policy has adopted a far less confrontational stance than that of the 1950s and now seeks
cooperation with China on many matters pertaining to nuclear weapons and the international
community.289
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